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ABSTRACT
The Impact of Foreign Aid on Voting 
Inside the United Nations
by
Daniel Shayne Morey
Dr. A. C. Tuttle, Examination Committee Chair 
Associate Professor of Political Science 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas
The purpose o f  this thesis is to determine if  there is a cormection between United 
States foreign aid donations and a recipient nation's voting patterns in the United Nations 
General Assembly. Tests in the past have not employed thorough methodologies to deal 
with the abundance o f  variables that influence a nation's voting behavior. The 
methodology created in this research focuses on three important conceptualizations.
First, this work creates a new definition of foreign aid; specifically, the inclusion of 
military aid in a nation’s aid package as well as loans and grants, despite their different 
characteristics. Second, this analysis considers only important votes to the donor nation, 
not all votes in the General Assembly. This research also develops a new understanding 
of abstentions, capturing the strategic nature of this voting choice. Finally, this study 
creates a classification scheme to break nations into homogenous groups.
m
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Does United States bilateral foreign aid win votes in the United Nations General 
Assembly? This has been a question for students of international relations since the 
establishment of the United Nations. However, to date there has been no satisfactory 
answer to this question, mainly because the methods employed and the understanding of 
United Nations policies have not been equal to the daunting task of interpreting the 
actions of nations in the United Nations. This research introduces a new way of 
exploring this topic with the hope of influencing future research and to provide an answer 
to whether aid influences nations in the United Nations.
There are three reasons why political scientists should reexamine the question of 
aid as a tool o f influence in the United Nations. First, the foreign aid program o f the 
United States is under political attack fiom both ends o f  the political spectrum. 
Conservatives in this country do not want taxpayers burdened with providing foreign aid 
because they feel it does not forward the national interest. Liberals view the aid budget 
as a potential target for cuts to allow continued funding of social policies under the tight 
fiscal conditions o f the 1990s. However, recent presidential administrations have fought 
drastic alterations to aid budgets, stating it is a necessary component of American 
diplomatic and national security efforts. It is clear only one side can be right in these
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
2political arguments; it is the task of international researchers to determine which, if 
possible. Exploring the connection between aid and voting is one step in this process.
Second, the United Nations is becoming a more popular topic in national politics 
and among average citizens. While an anti-United Nations movement is not sweeping 
the nation, discontent does appear to be rising. Many people view the United Nations as 
an anti-American institution working against the interest of the United States. Studies 
focusing on what truly takes place inside the United Nations will allow for rational debate 
o f the issues, instead of the wild speculation currently circulates in this country.
Finally, the United Nations and the world have changed since the early 1990s.
The end of the Cold War altered the structure o f global politics without alleviating the 
problems facing nations. Even i f  past studies were correct in their analysis o f the 
influence of aid, these conclusions are no longer reliable as evidence regarding the 
influence of aid today. It is time to reexamine this issue and test modem behavior in the 
United Nations.
This study is essentially an extensive methodology for how to approach the study 
o f aid and United Nations voting. It details the complexities of this research providing 
the reader with a full understanding the issues. Moving beyond description, this research 
offers prescriptions for dealing with these elements. Finally, this study offers some 
conclusion from an analysis o f  voting in the United Nations from 1995-1997.
Three topical areas divide this work. Chapters two and three provide relevant 
background information on this research. Chapter two outlines various theoretical 
approaches to studying aid to allow this worics placement among other research on this 
topic. With specific attention paid to international relations theories o f aid, which guide
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
3this research. Chapter three reviews pertinent past studies on this topic. The review 
covers only the essential points, instead o f providing a full review o f each article.
Further, a brief description o f each work accompanies the discussion o f the strengths and 
weaknesses o f the methods employed.
Chapters four, five, and six outline how to perform an accurate test o f aid and 
voting. Chapter four describes the issues dealing with aid; specifically what to include in 
a nations aid package and how to measure the strength o f aid (expected influence the 
amount of aid should have). Chapter five covers the multiple issues concerning votes in 
the United Nations. With attention focused on the idea o f important versus unimportant 
votes. Further, this chapter covers the multiple meanings o f abstentions. Finally, chapter 
six categorizes nations for comparison by focusing only on essential variables o f national 
voting behavior.
The conclusion comprises the final section of this work covering the results and 
policy implications o f the study. Further, this section provides an outline for future 
research on this topic.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER2 
IN THEORY
Establishing a fînn theoretical base is necessary to understand the issues in this 
research. As with all studies, this theoretical model will determine the questions asked as 
well as the manner in which they are answer. This chapter will survey the four 
theoretical camps dealing with foreign aid, with special attention given to the 
international relations approach. Further, this chapter will show the progression from the 
general question o f “Why nations give foreign aid?” to a specific question of “Does aid 
influence voting in the UN?” In the end, this chapter will construct a testable hypothesis 
firmly grounded in international relations theory.
It is important to note that not all of these theoretical camps derive fiom 
international relations studies. Instead, they derive from multiple fields o f political 
science as well as economics. Further, it is easy to envision the use o f research methods 
from other academic fields, particularly psychology and sociology, in answering these 
questions. Although, the primary focus of this study is the impact o f aid upon the 
relationship between nations, international relations, its base is not completely in this 
field. While other fields will not play a primary role in exploring the relationship 
between aid and voting, they do take on prominence in answering the larger question of 
“Why nations provide and accept foreign aid?” Evoi though this paper will focus only 
on the question o f aids’ influence on UN voting, it can never truly escape the larger
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5question in which it is embedded. Further, reviewing these other theoretical 
understandings will allow for the correct placement o f this work among the multitudes of 
research performed on foreign aid.
In reviewing these theoretical designs, this research will rely upon the typology 
created by John White. ‘ This typology clearly divides the work on foreign aid into 
meaningful sub-fields, which clarifies the discussion o f the topic. The four sub-fields 
White creates are supplemental, displacement, recipient-oriented, and donor-oriented 
theories.^ The first two sub-fields deal primarily with economic issues, the latter two 
cover political issues.
Economic Theories
Supplemental theories, also called positive theories, deal with the role o f foreign 
in the economic development o f recipient nations.^ These theories state that some 
essential factor of development is missing (savings, foreign exchange, or skilled labor) 
and that foreign aid can replace, or supplement, these missing ingredients. By 
supplementing these factors o f growth, foreign aid allows a nation to develop 
economically.'* In the end, the recipient nation will reach a certain development level and 
be able to sustain its growth without further aid.
Supplemental theories explain the purpose o f aid, but do not directly provide an 
answer to why a nation would provide aid. Unfortunately, the cohesiveness o f this 
theoretical group dissolves when answering this question. The answers vary fiom 
fu lfilling  the obligations o f developed nations towards underdeveloped nations to 
developing markets for donor exports. With the exception of fulfilling the duty o f the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6developed to the less developed, all o f these answers to why a nation provides foreign aid 
incorporate some form of direct advantage for the donor. These answers all provide an 
economic benefit to the donor and are not purely altruistic in nature.^
Displacement, or negative, theories comprise the second camp of economic 
theories.^ This group follows the same basic ideas o f supplemental theories; aid replaces 
a needed resource o f growth inside recipient nations. However, instead o f being helpful 
to the recipient, the aid is harmfiil. Instead of merely supplementing existing behavior, 
the aid replaces the needed behavior, or displaces it, causing the needed markets never to 
develop because the recipient nation sees no reason to invest in their development.^ If the 
needed markets never develop, the recipient nation is forever dependent upon foreign aid. 
This theory further states that this might be intentional to maintain the subservient 
relationship between donor and recipient. Displacement theorists believe aid is a tool of 
control and oppression designed not to encourage development but to stop or at least 
hinder it. Whether accidental or designed, displacement theories argue that aid harms 
development instead of fostering it as supplemental theorists maintain.^
Political Theories
Along with these competing economic theories, there exist two political science 
theories. Although not contradictory to one another, the two theories promote different 
ways of exploring foreign aid. The first theory focuses on how recipients use aid, the 
second concentrates on the uses o f aid from the donor’s perspective.
Recipient based theories, which derive from comparative politics, focus on the 
use of aid by recipient nations. More importantly, since aid goes to governments instead
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
of people, it focuses on how governments use aid resources.^ Accordingly, aid is a 
resource that individual governments use to support their reigns. In short, aid keeps 
governments from making hard political choices, such as cutting government social 
programs or raising taxes, which would be unpopular and lead to widespread discontent 
with the regime. Thus, aid underwrites the policies of a regime, enabling it to remain in 
power.
Recipient based theories, like the supplemental economic theories, answers how 
nations use aid, but does not inherently answer why a nation provides aid. To answer this 
question requires a retum to the donor’s goals, not the recipients. These theorist believe 
that donors desire global stability that results from maintaining ruling regimes, especially 
regimes fostering favorable foreign policies. Again, as with the economic theories, aid is 
far from altruistic.
Donor-based theories occupy the rest o f this chapter and serve as the theoretical 
base o f this study. Employing donor-based theories supplies a clear answer to why a 
nation would provide aid. Unlike the other theoretical camps that discuss how nations 
can use aid and then speculate to why a nation would provide it, donor-based theories 
concentrate solely on why a nation provides foreign aid. Instead of looking at the 
economic issues involved or internal uses of aid, donor based theories take an 
intemational relations approach to examining aid. This theoretical model explores the 
changing relationship between nations when one provides aid to another. Inherent in the 
donor-based theories is the assumption that donor nations attempt to gain political 
advantage from recipient nations.
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8The nature o f the relationship between donor and recipient nation may vary. One 
version of this relationship has recipients becoming dependent upon aid and unable to 
survive without it. In order to ensure aids continued inflow, the recipient nation agrees to 
demands made by the donor nation, whether explicit or implicit. A second version has a 
voluntary basis in which recipients agree in advance to perform certain functions, or 
allow certain actions, in exchange for aid. Regardless of the exact mechanics of the 
relationship, the provision of aid is to win support from other nations. (See diagram 2-1) 
It is this belief that donor nations seek to influence recipient nations through foreign aid, 
and donor-based theories, that this research will test empirically.
Influence Q
RecipientDonor
Aid
Diagram 2-1
Hans Morgenthau provides the best elaboration of donor theories. Morgenthau 
developed a theory o f foreign aid that outlined the basic goal o f  aid and attempted to 
show where aid policy has gotten away from its original purpose. True to his realist 
roots^\ Morgenthau states that aid is a tool o f foreign policy with its sole purpose being 
to gain influence. According to Morgaithau, there are six types o f  aid: humanitarian, 
subsistence, economic, military, prestige, and bribery, hi order to understand 
Morgenthau’s point a brief review o f these aid types is required.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
9The first type o f aid, humanitarian, is the only type of aid that is not inherently 
political. As Morgenthau defines it, humanitarian aid is aid that governments extend to 
other governments which are . .victims o f  natural disasters”.'^ If aid were attributable 
to certain governments then it would serve a political purpose by establishing a positive 
mindset inside o f recipient governments and, less importantly, in the people.'^ To 
perceive a recipient nation as generous and benevolent establishes a favorable political 
connection between two nations and a favorable view of the donors system of 
government. Thus, even humanitarian aid develops influence for a donor nation, if 
conducted properly.
Subsistence aid is money provided to nations unable to "... maintain minimal 
public services". In other words, subsistence aid eliminates budget deficits in nations 
not commanding enough resources to provide needed services to their citizens. The 
political impacts of this form of aid are clear. First, it defends the status quo maintaining 
governments that would likely fall in the absence of aid. Second, any government 
receiving subsistence aid will be unlikely to risk losing it for fear of falling firom power. 
For if  governments are unable to maintain “minimal public services” the citizens of the 
country will replace them. This fear offers a clear avenue of influence for donor nations.
Aid for economic development is the next type. This is aid designated to help 
build the economic infirastmcture of a nation in hope o f aiding the overall development of 
the nation. However, Morgenthau attacks this version o f aid as unwise and unworkable. 
First, he attacks the idea that a deficiency causes slow development and the belief that 
foreign aid can overcome the problem. Morgenthau correctly states that in certain 
circumstances slow development is not caused by one deficiency, but rather development
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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is not possible for certain countries. Expending money on projects and training can not 
overcome the fact that some nations lack any ability to develop beyond a certain point.
However, Morgenthau is most persuasive when he identifies political factors 
influencing developmental aid. In short, development is a destabilizing event that can, 
and likely will, lead to greater harm for American interests in the end. By altering the 
economic structure of any nation, the United States risks bringing to power a collection 
of individuals that may not be fiiendly in action or philosophy. Further instability 
accompanies the transformation between primitive and advanced economies; the turmoil 
in Russia is evidence of this fact. It is impossible to predict the conclusion of these 
upheavals and can lead to damage even if  in the end a friendly govermnent is 
established.
Military aid, which dominated American foreign aid until the 1960’s, is the third 
form of aid. However, Morgenthau states that military aid does not play a military role as 
much as a political one. He declares that donors “ ... seeks political advantage in 
exchange for military aid. It obligates by implication the recipient toward the giver”. 
Military aid operates as a bribe, obligating recipients to forgo actions that would cause 
the donor to revoke assistance.
The purpose of prestige aid is to outfit an underdeveloped nation with external 
appearances o f modernity. In this function, aid funds vast projects that give appearances 
of technological and economic advancement These projects take on a variety o f forms 
firom airports to roads -  which do not need to serve a real function, especially 
economically. Donors and recipients do not openly recognize prestige aid; instead, they
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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hide projects under the categories o f military or economic aid. Prestige aid operates, like 
military aid, as a bribe, according to Morgenthau.*’
Bribes comprise the final form o f aid, and its one true purpose according to 
Morgenthau. Bribes are transfers o f money and/or services finm one government to 
another as the " ... price paid for political services rendered or to be rendered”.^ ** These 
services take on a variety of forms meant to provide the donor with some advantage, as 
identified in the following paragraphs. Bribery is the true purpose o f all types o f aid, 
with the possible exception o f humanitarian aid. Further, this has been the purpose of aid 
throughout history. Morgenthau’s theory o f  aid as a bribe puts the question at hand into 
clear relief. By replacing the word aid with bribe in diagram one, the basic principle of 
donor-based theories is clear. (See diagram 2-2)
Influence | Q
RecipientDonor
Bribe
Diagram 2-2
The problem with connecting aid as bribery comes firom the fact that modem 
nations, especially the United States, have sought to hide the true nature o f the 
relationship. They have developed complex cover stories, such as aid for development, 
and established government agaicies to achieve these mythical goals. In the end, the 
cover story o f aid for development has become mistaken for reality and both recipient
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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and donor nations are unhappy with the relationship. The recipient is unhappy over 
excess strings attached to aid and donors feel betrayed by the recipient for not following 
their end o f the bargain, supporting the donor. Thus, disguising the connection of aid as a 
bribe confuses participants, each expecting something different from the relationship."'
The recipient expects altruistic aid while the donor expects to gain influence over the 
recipient.
In summary, donor theories state that aid is a tool to influence recipient nations, or 
as Morgenthau states, it is a bribe presented in exchange for specific actions. As 
straightforward as this theory is there exist methodological problems with its application. 
The main obstacle attempting to measure the concept o f  influence.
Applying Donor Theories 
No comparisons o f aid and influence can be performed without first defining 
when or how to measure influence. There are varied options open for research. One 
could look at government statements from recipient nations, or troop commitments to 
actions led by the donor nations. Alternatively, research may find influence in the text of 
bilateral treaties. However, all of these options pose very serious problems for 
researchers. Wars take place too infrequently to provide comparative value. The only 
major US engagements in the past 50 years have been Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War. 
This limited number does not provide enough data points to conduct a strong aggregated 
study. Further, the octreme differences between engagements, both in time and in 
substance, makes comparisons among them difficult, i f  not impossible. Official 
statements o f  governments can often be misleading or contradictory. Politicians can
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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design statements to meet multiple goals ranging from assuring an ally to winning 
domestic political support. Determining the true audience for a statement could also 
prove to be very difficult. Further, there is the question of whose statements to use. Are 
all statements a government makes, especially a coalition government with its multiple 
members, taken at equal value? These problems combine to make statement analysis 
studies very impractical. Finally, treaties happen irregularly and contain a combination 
of intemational forces and domestic politics. Further, after reviewing a  variety of 
treaties, it is clear there are few similarities to test.^ There is such a variety of subject 
matter for treaties with no topic uniformly applicable to all nations. Further, the number 
of multilateral treaties complicates this type of study. By increasing the number of 
signatories to a treaty, it becomes difficult to assess who has influenced whom in the 
negotiations.
With none o f these research methods being adequate, researchers have 
concentrated on voting in the United Nations to gauge influence. The basic premise is 
simple. Donor nations use aid to buy or win votes from recipient nations within the 
United Nations (Diagram 2-3). If  aid leads to influence, recipient nations should vote in 
agreement with donor nations, usually defined as an identical vote to the donor.
According to this model, voting in the United Nations should be a function of the amount 
of aid received. (See formula 2-1)
The practice o f using voting in the United Nations, as a gauge o f  influence, has 
become widespread but is not uniformly accepted. Some authors believe that United 
Nations votes have declined in importance over the years and donor nations no longer 
seek to influence the outcome o f these votes.^ However, evidence seems to be to the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
14
contrary, especially for the United States. In recent years the United States has come to 
place a high value on UN support. Evidence of this can be seen from US efforts to 
ensure UN support o f the Gulf War, as well as US concern over the new Secretary 
General. It would seem irrational for the US to exert these efforts if  they viewed the UN, 
and votes of the General Assembly, as irrelevant.
Votes
RecipientDonor
Bribe
Diagram 2-3
Formula 2-1 
Support = Votes = /  (aid)
This chapter reviewed the four contending theories dealing with foreign aid, 
allowing for a better understanding of the issues involved with this research. Further, the 
donor-based perspective on aid, when elaborated in detail provides a firm understanding 
o f how to study foreign aid, as a bribe for specific actions. Finally, and most importantly, 
the general question o f why a nation provides foreign aid has been transformed through 
several steps into a testable question, “Does aid influence voting in the UN?” Before
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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proceeding with the layout o f this study it is necessary to review other research on aid 
and UN voting, reexamining the results these studies have found and the methods 
employed.
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CHAPTERS 
IN PRACTICE
Flowing from the theoretical work of chapter two, many scholars have attempted 
to determine the correlation between aid and voting patterns. These studies are the 
primary focus here in the third chapter. A review o f the methods and results of these 
diverse studies will demonstrate the need for a new approach, especially in the new post 
Cold War environment
As with all research the first question that must be asked is how best to approach 
the question. When exploring whether aid alters voting two different types of studies are 
typical. The first type, the case study, follows a particular issue over time and measuring 
the influence o f aid against voting on that single issue, or set o f related issues. The 
second approach involves aggregate studies covering several years and votes on 
numerous issues. Most of the studies of aid and voting have been the second type; in 
fact, there has been only one well-circulated case study on this subject. Because it was 
the first study performed and because of its conceptual significance, considerable 
attention is devoted to the case study before turning to the aggregate studies.
Case Study
The only published example of a voting and foreign aid case study is Bernstein 
and Alpert’s 1971 article “Foreign Aid and Voting Behavior in the United Nations: The
18
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Admission o f Communist China”. This study sought to measure the connection between 
foreign aid and voting in the UN by looking at one single issue, which nation would 
receive the credentials as the representative of China.* With multiple votes on this issue 
spanning a number o f  years, this case provides a chance to study the impact of changes in 
aid on the same topic. This assumes that the position o f a nation on the topic remains 
constant over time, which they do not. However, within the confines of the Cold War it 
is a safe assumption that very few nations would have a spontaneous change o f heart 
regarding the admission of a communist nation thus minimizing the impact of outside 
factors.
Bernstein and Alpert start with a very simple set of assumptions. First, both the 
United States and the Soviet Union would seek to build the necessary coalition to win the 
vote and then would seek to conserve resources by not expending any more than 
absolutely necessary.^ Second, nations do not make all important decisions on the floor, 
but behind the scenes permitting a certain degree o f bargaining. Finally, neither of the 
Cold War camps would suffer any defections during voting. Instead, to gain the number 
of votes needed to win, both camps would have to obtain the support of non-aligned 
nations, particularly those in the Third World.^
Based on these assiunptions, they hypothesized that a nation has three choices 
depending on who is providing aid. I f  the nation is receiving aid from both camps then 
they should abstain. I f  the nation is receiving aid from only one o f the two donors, the 
United States or the Soviet Union, then they should vote with the donor. Finally, a nation 
receiving no aid should abstain. According to Bernstein and AJperf s theory no recipient 
would vote directly against a donor, which did occur.
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When they conducted their test, they found that nations did not behave completely 
as predicted. First, nations receiving aid from both camps overwhelmingly voted yes (for 
PRC admission) when they should have abstained. Further, when nations received no aid 
the plmality voted no (46 percent).'* However, when a nation received aid from only one 
camp they voted as predicted 90 percent of the time. Despite the anomalies, Bernstein 
and Alpert concluded that foreign aid and voting are connected and that aid is an 
effective instrument o f foreign policy.
While instructive, the Bernstein and Alpert piece suffers from multiple 
deficiencies. The first and most obvious is that it is hard to generalize finm a case study. 
Since the votes dealt with only one topic, it is hard to determine if  the subject matter or 
foreign aid was the crucial factor.
Further, Bernstein and Alpert assume that an abstention is a neutral vote that 
would not harm either camp. Thus, a nation receiving aid firom both should abstain. 
However, in this case, since the Soviet Union needed a supermajority according to United 
Nations rules, an abstention by a nation receiving aid from them meant the Soviet Union 
had wasted resources, while the United States in effect gained a vote.
Along this same line, the authors did not attempt to correlate levels of aid and 
voting. Instead aid is a binary variable, simply on or off. It is irrational to believe that a 
nation would run the risk o f losing a large amount of aid simply to protect a smaller 
amount. It makes sense to assume that when a nation received aid from both camps the 
relative amount o f aid determined its vote. A  nation would only abstain if  the amounts 
were equal. Consideration o f relative levels o f aid should improve the predictions for 
nations receiving aid fixrm both camps.
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Bernstein and Alpert also do not account for the strategic nature o f  nations. They 
predict that nations receiving no aid should abstain from voting because they do not have 
a stake in the matter. However, since abstention maintained the status quo, forcing 
further votes, the nations not receiving aid increased their chances of receiving aid in the 
future giving them a stake in the outcome. Strategically minded nations have a built-in 
preference for forcing future votes, a preference that Bernstein and Alpert neglected and 
the Soviets had to overcome.
Finally, Bernstein and Alpert assume that each camp was only attempting to 
achieve one goal. In their design, nations provided aid to ensure the proper vote on one 
issue. However, the two camps could have been providing aid for votes on other issues. 
This is a special concern in the case of the United States, which needed only a few votes 
to block the entry of the PRC. Following this logic, the United States might have 
provided aid to nations that voted yes to ensure their votes on other issues because they 
were already sure o f victory on the China issue. Thus, the United States could have been 
working toward multiple goals that might have clouded the results of this study. Only by 
looking at voting tendencies as a whole, which was outside the scope of this case study, 
could control for this contingency.
Although this case study did not conclusively answer the question at hand, it did 
establish the link between aid and UN voting and it further provided the starting point for 
future research. Building on this work, other scholars have attempted to correct some of 
its basic problems to strengthen the case for or against foreign aid. However, solutions 
vary widely. The only true commonality is that they are all aggregate studies o f voting 
and aid.
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Aggregate Studies
When performing an aggregated study a researcher must address certain issues.
The approach to these issues largely determines the conclusions each study reaches. By 
looking at each issue and the authors method for dealing with it the complexity of each 
study becomes clear. This level o f complexity is what distinguishes these works.
Nations
The first issue of concem is how to treat the nations under study. The first and 
most obvious division is between donor and recipient. However, among the recipient 
nations there exists a wide degree o f diversity to account for in any study o f this nature.
In a survey o f factors affecting UN voting, Kul B. Rai illustrated the impact of these 
kinds o f differences. Relevant differences involve military alliances, ideological 
orientation o f the government, the electoral system, level o f economic development, 
geographic location, and colonial status.^ Rai speculates that all of these variables affect 
how a nation is disposed to vote on an issue before the General Assembly. Even though 
not all o f the variables tested turned out to be significant several did including geography, 
former colonial status, military alliances, and economic circumstances.*^ Clearly some 
attempt to divide nations into more homogeneous groupings is required to study the 
impact o f aid and voting accinrately.^
It should not be smprising that not all research has ctq>italized on these findings, 
or at least has not taken full advantage o f them. First, Wittkopfs 1973 study preceded 
Rai’s woric. However, later works have not heeded Rai’s results nearly enough.
Ironically, not even Rai integrated his original findings fully in his follow-up study on
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voting and aid performed in 1980. Here Rai only divided nations along geographic lines. 
While this study did find a stronger correlation between aid and voting when factoring in 
geogr^hy, it still might have underestimated this impact because o f the exclusion of 
other variables.
The most extensive attempt to control for outside factors comes from Sexton and 
Decker. They divided nations by type o f government and level of economic 
development However, Sexton and Decker only had two categories for nations in each 
division. In their design, nations were either democratic or totalitarian and developed or 
less developed economically.* This provided for only four total types o f nations: 
democratic developed, democratic undeveloped, totalitarian developed, and totalitarian 
undeveloped. This scheme does not come close to capturing the essence of the 
differences among nations. This effort is clearly the most complex attempt to classify 
nations but it is far from adequate. In order to frilly divide nations into meaningful 
homogeneous groups research must look at more issues then government type and 
economic development Further, by having only two types of governments and levels of 
development is overly simplistic and does not provide an adequate classification scheme.
Another question concerning nations is which or how many to include in the 
study. This may seem like a very non-conflictual question; however, it defies an easy 
answer, hi fact, existing studies have used different groups of nations in their tests. In 
their study, Sexton and Decker generally used all nations in the United Nations, though 
they excluded Israel finm some analyses arguing that it was skewing the results. It is 
interesting to note that they do not make any direct comparison between the nations 
receiving aid and those that are not^ This seems to be a rather important omission when
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attempting to answer the question of aid’s impact on voting. Without making a 
comparison between the group receiving aid and the group not receiving aid, it is difficult 
to observe the true influence o f aid. Nations not receiving aid provide comparison for 
recipient behavior.
Two other studies*® use very select samples for their test. First, Wittkopf uses 
only nations receiving ‘positive aid’, (i.e., those actually receiving aid) fi-om one of 
sixteen potential donors during the years of his study. He finther restricts his sample by 
requiring that recipient nations were present for at least 60 percent of the votes for the 
General Assembly sessions in question.* * Nonetheless, 96 o f 115 potential nations make 
it into the sample, a high percentage.'^
Rai includes only nations classified as less developed that were receiving aid.
This is by far the most restrictive sample employed. Under this method the number of 
nations studied shrinks to as low as 66 in some years. *^  This may not seem like a huge 
decrease from WittkopFs 96; however, the UN had grown between the two studies.
The biggest problem with Rai’s sample is that by excluding nations not classified 
as “less developed” (an exact definition of this term is not given) the sample may have 
been biased towards weak results. In particular in 1972 Rai had found that economic 
development was an important factor in the voting behavior o f nations. By intentionally 
excluding better developed nations receiving aid Rai may have weakened his results.
Given his earlier evidence it does not seem wise to limit the sample in such a manner 
when looking for a general trend among nations.
The final question concerning nations in these studies is how many donor nations 
to study simultaneously. In most studies, multiple donors are used.*'* hi both o f Rai’s
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studies he explores Soviet and American aid together and compares the results each 
nation has achieved. His findings, which show Soviet economic aid more effective at the 
same time U.S. military aid was more effective, are interesting but do not necessarily 
answer the question at hand. Wittkopf also compares many donor nations. He finds that 
they all achieve about the same level o f success with their aid programs. Finally, Sexton 
and Decker use only the United States for their design.
Based on W ittkopfs finding that all nations have about the same success rate, and 
the fact that as the number of donor nations grows the amount of data needed becomes 
very unmanageable, it seems sensible to test only one donor nation at a time. Further, the 
fact that the United States provides aid to more nations than any other country, especially 
with the demise o f the Soviet Union, warrants Sexton and Decker’s concentration on the 
United States.
Aid
The second set o f issues facing researchers concerns the conceptualization of aid. 
Although this may seem minor, it does take on a high level of importance. When looking 
at this type of study altering what is included in the calculation of aid has a deep impact. 
Further, the inclusion or exclusion o f certain types o f aid allows for the manipulation of 
outcomes.
hi this research, there are two basic types of aid: economic and military. The 
purpose of economic aid is to stimulate economic growth while military aid is to secure 
alliances and promote the defense o f the recipient nations. In his fibrst study, Rai found 
that both types of aid have an impact; however, the impact varies according to the nation
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studied.*^ Further, he found that military aid was more effective for the United States 
than economic aid.
Most research, however, has focused on economic aid. In fact, only Sexton and 
Decker use a model that includes anything other than economic aid. Focusing on only 
one form of aid leads to an under-evaluation o f the amount of aid a nation receives 
because military aid comprises a large portion o f many nations’ aid packages. The most 
extreme case o f this is Israel, which receives armually over one billion dollars in military 
aid.*® Leaving this out o f the calculation seems not only unwarranted but to cause a 
definite skew in the data presented.
Another issue involves how to calculate the importance o f  aid to the nation 
receiving it. Currently, there are three different ways to conceptualize what I will refer to 
as ‘strength of aid’: total aid in raw amounts (however defined), aid per capita of the 
recipient nation, and aid as a percentage of the recipient’s GDP.*^
Wittkopf used only total aid amounts (over a three year time span) to test for 
correlations. Sexton and Decker tested both total amounts and per capita aid in their 
study. Rai employed all three measures of the strength of aid. Rai and Wittkopf found 
that aggregate aid did not have an impact; however, Rai did find that per c ^ ita  bad a 
strong effect. In contrast, Sexton and Decker found no coimections using any strength of 
aid measures.
Another issue concerning aid is the conceptualization o f  the role it plays. Rai has 
symbolized the importance o f aid in two different ways. First, Rai thinks donors use aid 
to induce certain behaviors fiom recipient nations. Second, aid can function as a 
punishment for nations past actions. Sexton and Decker along with Wittkopf both
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assume that aid induces future behavior, not punish past actions. Wittkopf explicitly tests 
the punishment hypothesis finding that it is not accurate for U.S. aid, which is what Rai 
also found. However, the conceptualization of aid is very important for it determines the 
direction of the correlation performed. If aid wins votes, then increased aid should win 
more votes thus, a forward (linearly speaking) connection. However, if  aid punishes for 
voting behavior in the past then the correlation is a backward one. Put another way if aid 
wins support an increase in aid one year then should lead to favorable votes increasing in 
the next year. Conversely if  aid rewards or punishes past behavior then favorable votes 
increasing in year one should lead us to expect aid to increase in year two. Thus, how aid 
is conceptualizes determines the direction of the correlation that we expect to find.
Votes
The final issue facing researchers is how to define votes in the United Nations. 
There are four choices open to every nation (yes, no, abstain, absent); studies of this type 
would be much easier if  only the first two were options. The meaning o f the latter two 
choices is not always easy to identify. Further, not all votes have the same degree of 
importance to all nations. Certain subjects affect a nation directly while others are 
relatively unimportant. By this logic, nations, especially donor nations, would seek to 
influence only those votes that are important to them. Surprisingly, there has been a great 
deal o f consensus among researchers on these two questions.
First, following W ittkopfs lead, no study has attempted to explore the 
relationship between important votes to donors and aid. Wittkopf focused attention
... on the relationship between aid and voting preference o f developing
states identifiable on the basis of all of these votes: no attempt will be
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made to identify “critical” votes or specific issues o f particular 
significance to either aid donors or recipients.**
In order to prove a general trend Wittkopf felt that all votes should be included, not just
important ones. Unfortunately, he does not provide a logical reason for this abstention.
He does mention that other research has attempted to discover the connection between
aid and important issues but dismisses them because “Generally speaking” the results
have not suggested a connection.*’
Wittkopf cites a study he performed with James Green on voting behavior and the
Chinese admission question as proof o f his point.^® Nevertheless, he ignores other
studies such as the Bernstein and Albert piece. At best, it is safe to say that the question
of important votes versus general votes is still open; however, Wittkopf assumed it was
closed without providing reasonable evidence why, establishing the practice of ignoring
the differences between critical and general votes.^*
When exploring abstentions there has again been remaricable similarity between
the studies. Only Rai's 1980 work has deviated from the norm. Sexton and Decker as
well as Wittkopf do not attempt to explore the meaning of abstention. This is not
surprising because both studies theorize that aid recipients should vote exactly as the
donor did. Thus, abstention should only happen when the donor abstains. Using this
methodology there are no alternatives for how to view abstentions. Although this is
certainly easier when dealing with such a wide array of data, it may not be entirely
accurate. As Rai highlights there are multiple meanings to non-votes.^ He states that
nations may be absent (non-vote) because they object to the vote and refuse to take part.^
In this case, the non-vote is indeed a very strong vote no. Other meanings are also
possible. Rai does not attempt to sort out these problems. Instead, he limits his study to
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counting an absence as an abstention, except when a nation is absent to protest a vote.
This is an improvement but still missing some important points. For example, is an 
abstention to avoid voting against a donor nation to be considered support?
Consideration o f these types o f questions has yet to take place.
Results
It is not surprising that with so many unresolved methodological issues there has 
been little agreement about whether aid affects voting in the UN. The three full studies 
focused on here cover the spectrum of possible outcomes. Sexton and Decker find no 
connection between the two variables, though when Israel is removed firom the model the 
coefficients become negative.^^ Wittkopf finds strong support for a negative relationship, 
arguing that aid “rewards our enemies”.^  However, he ultimately believes even this 
relationship to be spurious. Rai finds that, using per c ^ ita  measures, there is a positive 
relationship between aid and votes.^® With these various results, it is little wonder that 
there is no general agreement in the field about the connection between aid and voting 
and that the question is still actively debated. The last section discusses how to improve 
research on the connection between aid and voting.
Conclusion; Towards a New Research Agenda 
As if  the research issues discussed above are not serious enough, this research 
also suffers firom the passage of time. The world has changed greatly since even the most 
recent study in 1992. The end o f the Cold War and the realignment of nations have made 
this research even more complicated. Research can not perform case studies between two
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large blocks as Bernstein and Alpert did. Further, research must reexamine many of the 
past accepted assumptions.
First, Rai’s 1972 study on what impacts voting patterns in the UN needs updating 
for the UN of the 1990s. In order to divide nations accurately into more homogeneous 
blocks to test the impact o f aid, research must identify the important characteristics of 
nations. Then a classification scheme for nations must accurately control for outside 
variables that have tainted past studies. Rai’s original work, along with Sexton and 
Decker's simple classification scheme, demonstrates clearly the need to stop treating all 
nations as equal. Performing aggregate studies comparing nations without controlling for 
differences will be to compare apples to oranges. To accurately assess the effects of 
foreign aid on voting behavior there must be a test performed on nations that are as 
similar as possible. Even though it is not possible to account for every trait or variable, 
there must be a more sophisticated model than employed in the past.
Further, an updated research design should include all members of the United 
Nations. Looking at only nations receiving aid ignores half of the question. If there is no 
comparison between aid recipients and non-recipients part of the impact of aid upon 
nations is omit Designing this control group, into the categorization of nations, will 
provide researchers will a great deal more data on the question. If it is possible to show 
that similar nations receiving aid vote at a higher rate with the donor nations than those 
not receiving aid, this would provide evidence for the influential powers of foreign aid.
Just as researchers must rethink their treatment o f nations, they must also alter 
their understanding o f aid. First, economic aid must lose it place of primacy. Future 
studies should not ignore the role military aid plays. Combining military and economic
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aid will reflect the full amount of support a nation receives from aid. By excluding 
military aid past research has undervalued the influence donor nations have over 
recipients. Considering the amount of aid that is classified as military they may have 
done so in a drastic way. Research should continue to determine if there is a substantial 
difference between economic and military aid. However, until there is a satisfactory 
answer there should be no amount of aid mccluded.
Finally, research needs to explore the various complexities of votes in the United 
Nations. Treating all votes as equal suffers firom the same type o f conceptual problems as 
treating all nations identically. The first issue to address is important vs. general votes. 
There may be no difference between the two types o f votes but this should be resolved 
empirically. Second, researchers must develop a more sophisticated scheme for looking 
at abstentions and absences, one that accounts for strategic voting. The goal o f a donor 
nation is not necessarily to achieve identical votes firom all o f its recipient nations.
Instead, as the Bernstein and Alpert article shows, the goal o f a nation is to win the 
overall vote on a resolution. By this logic, an abstention or an absence may be helpful to 
a donor nation, in determining the final outcome of the vote.
Successfully addressing these issues will move us closer to a definitive answer to 
the question o f whether aid impacts voting in the United Nations. Although the research 
agenda above does not solve every problem, it moves in the right direction. Rewriting 
the formula o f influence to incorporate these ideas creates Formula 3-1.
Formula 3-1 
Support = /  (aid, vote, nation)
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CHAPTER4
DEFINITIONS AND CONCEPTS OF AID 
In order to improve testing between foreign aid and United Nations voting there is 
a need to alter traditional understandings of the term “aid”. Research must reexamine 
and alter traditional beliefo and definitions in order to align this research with factual and 
logical evidence as well as the new global environment. There are three main issues to 
resolve: first, what categories o f aid to use in calculating a nations total aid package, 
second, the differences between loans and grants, and finally, how to determine the 
strength of aid. This chapter will review these issues and define how this study will 
resolve them.
Mihtary vs. Economic Aid 
The first concept to clarify is the need to incorporate military aid into the 
calculations o f a nation’s aid package. As noted in chapter three, most studies have only 
used economic aid to determine the amount of aid a nation receives. While this is 
expedient, it does not adequately capture the impact aid has on recipient nations. By 
underestimating the amount o f aid received, past studies have not measured foreign aid 
against UN voting ; instead they have measured economic aid and determined that it does 
not have a significant impact on voting. Supporting the claim to include military aid are
34
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logical and factual reasons, along with empirical evidence. This section will explore 
these issues and demonstrate the need to include military aid.
Research must not ignore four essential observations when considering military 
aid. These observations do not provide all o f the evidence for the inclusion o f aid; 
however, they provide the base for the overall argument.
The first observation is that historically, military aid has been the largest portion 
o f American foreign aid.* This is no surprise since most of American aid history has 
taken place under the shadow o f the Cold War. However, in recent years economic aid 
has surpassed military aid although the latter remains a large and significant percentage 
of total aid. In 1995, military aid comprised ^jproximately twenty-five percent o f the 
total aid budget.^ This is one o f the lowest points, in percentage, for military aid. In 
1995, emphasis shifted to providing transition assistance to many former communist 
nations, which drastically increased economic loans and grants while military aid 
remained unchanged. By 1997, military aid comprised approximately thirty-eight percent 
o f the aid budget, restoring the balance.^ It is important to note that the 1997 numbers are 
more representative of aid in recent times. The approximate split between economic and 
military aid is consistently sixty/forty.
Thus, not incorporating military aid amounts excludes approximately forty 
percent of American assistance. Even using the lower percentage o f 1995 as a base line 
would exclude one-fourth o f all aid. In order to test the full impact o f aid on UN voting 
all aid must be included. Otherwise, only the impact o f  the counted portions o f aid is 
analyzed not the effect of aid as a whole.
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A second fact to take into account is which nations receive military aid. It is clear 
from reviewing military aid contributions that nations receiving military aid tend to be 
strong US allies. The United States does not provide military aid to all nations; instead, 
nations that are of strategic interest, and nations that have strong ties with the US, receive 
military aid. The best example of this is Israel, which receives 1.8 billion dollars in 
military aid, the largest amount to any single nation.* Examples o f other nations receiving 
significant amounts o f aid (one million dollars or more) also demonstrate the fact that the 
United States provides aid to military and political important nations, such as Poland, 
Thailand, and Turkey. Even though not every nation fits this pattern, the overall trend 
does favor strong US allies receiving military aid. Excluding military aid weakens the 
correlation between aid and UN voting, especially for nations receiving the majority of 
their money in the form of military aid. Comparatively speaking, excluding military aid 
lowers the amount of aid that strong supporters receive at the same time raising the 
amount less supportive nations receive. This leads to weaker, less reliable results than 
are achievable.
The third fact is that certain nations receive only military aid. Examples of this 
class of nations in 1997 included Estonia, Comoros, Bahrain, and Argentina.® Although 
the total amounts of aid are limited, usually under one million dollars, by only counting 
economic aid these nations ^jpear to receive no aid, which is very different than 
receiving a small amount of aid. This wül be even more important when designing a new 
strength o f aid indicator. Here it is sufficient to state by not counting military aid a 
sizable portion o f nations are not counted as receiving any aid, which will skew any 
attempt at correlating aid and voting.
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Finally, past studies have linked military aid and recipient behavior. First, Rai 
found economic and military aid both had some connection to voting support, Rai also 
found that different forms of aid had different success rates based on the donor nations 
studied.® By choosing between categories o f aid, the researcher can manipulate results of 
these types of studies. Further, Morgenthau clearly links military aid and support, stating 
that nations understood the true nature o f military aid (as a bribe) more than with 
economic aid.^ In order to test Morgenthau’s theory, military aid must be included.
Now that the logical and factual arguments for including military aid are clear, it 
is time to look at the actual impact of including military aid. The use of a ten-nation 
sample will illustrate the impact of the issues mentioned. This sample is not 
representative of the total population but includes nations from all geographic regions. 
Table 4-1 provides both the military and economic aid amounts for the sample.
Table 4-1 sorts the nations by amount o f  economic aid received. It is clear from 
comparing the economic and military aid columns that the ranking criteria (economic or 
military aid) drastically alters the ordering. Only three nations remain in the same 
position, Israel, El Salvador, and Albania, all o f  the others shift some dramatically. What 
this illustrates is if it is expect that nations receiving more aid support the United States 
more often, then how they are ranked will determine largely whether this expectation will 
be achieved.
To illustrate the importance of mihtary aid to nations receiving it Table 4-1 also 
presents mihtary aid as a percent of total aid. This best illustrates the importance of 
mihtary aid, which has a different impact on almost ever nation, percentages range from 
100 to 0. What is important to note is the nations that are in the middle. Sixty percent of
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Israel's aid would not be included in its total aid package without military aid. Thailand 
and Argentina are also «ccellent cases for including military aid; each of these nations 
would have sixteen percent o f their aid unincorporated without military aid. In other 
years, utilizing only economic aid would result in counting certain nations as receiving no 
aid when in fact they received large amounts o f military aid.*
Table 4- 1 
Ten Nation Sample - Aid Distribution
Name Military Aid Economic Aid Total Aid Percent Militf
Israel 1,800 1,200 3,000 60.0%
Ethiopia .2 119.6 119.8 0.2%
El Salvador .4 63.2 63.6 0.6%
Albania .2 31.2 31.4 0.6%
Zimbabwe .2 21.6 21.8 0.9%
Swaziland .1 13.4 13.5 0.7%
Belarus .1 11.1 11.2 0.9%
Yemen 0 8.1 8.1 0.0%
Thailand 1 5.1 6.1 16.4%
Argentina .1 .5 .6 16.7%
Data from U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants 1995 -  in millions.
It is important to note that when sorting the nations according to economic aid and 
total aid, the orderings are identical. This is not an indictment against military aid. 
Instead, it is a function of the sample chosen to illustrate these points. Further, even if 
economic and total aid rankings were the same for all nations, it would not justify the 
exclusion of military aid. Including only economic aid misrepresents the total aid 
package of nations exclusively receiving military aid.
This section outlined the reasons, both logical and empirical, for the inclusion o f 
military aid in any correlation study between aid and voting in the UN. The purpose o f
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this section was to illustrate the significance o f  excluding military aid out on these 
studies. After observing the difTerence made by disregarding military aid, it becomes 
clear that it must be included in any true test o f  aid and voting in the UN.
Grants and Loans
Past studies have not inquired into the different effects o f grants and loans. Since 
each has different characteristics, each should have a different impact upon recipients; 
however, there has been no attempt to analyze this issue.
The basic difference between loans and grants determines the influence o f each. 
Despite possessing low interest rates, loans are not gifts and the recipient must repay 
them. Unlike loans, donors provide grants to recipients without expectations o f 
repayment. It is logical that a nation would be more likely to support a donor nation 
when they do not have to return the money. While not always the case, sometimes loans 
are a direct tool o f bribery. This is not to say that loans, especially very low interest 
loans, do not affect recipient behavior; instead, it is likely that loans have a small impact. 
Because loans are contractual obligations extending over several years the donor nation 
can not withhold funds, or alter the agreement to the recipient’s detriment, for 
unsupportive nations. However, donor nations can withhold grants for any reason 
because they appropriate them on a yearly basis. Reinforcing this is the fact that there are 
many multinational organizations that provide loans to nations, thus eliminating reliance 
on one source. I f  a  nation did not have other borrowing opportunities the effect on their 
behavior would most likely be greater.
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This study will not differentiate between loans and grants for two reasons. First, 
loans do have some impact on recipient behavior as discussed above. Second, and most 
important, America provides very little aid in the form of loans. In fact, 4.9 percent of all 
aid in 1995 was in the form o f loans while 95 percent was grants.’ These numbers are 
representative o f aid disbursements in the 1990s with some variances: aid composition 
has gone as high as 10 percent loan with 90 percent grant. Currently few nations receive 
aid in the form o f loans; America provides the majority of its foreign aid as grants to 
nations. Even Israel, the United States greatest aid recipient, receives all o f its funds in 
grants. In the sample o f nations from above (Table 4-1), only Belarus receives any o f its 
funds as loans (76%). In Belarus aid may exercise less influence; however, there are few 
cases where the majority o f aid is loans making a test o f this proposition impossible. For 
this study, no differentiation between loans and grants will take place. Differentiating 
between loans and grants would not make a vast difference in the overall amount o f aid 
provided. Further, as stated in the first section, research on this topic should incorporated 
all aid if possible.
Strength o f Aid
The final issue concerning aid is how to measure the expected impact o f aid. Put 
another way, what measure best determines the effect of aid for comparison between 
nations. Exploring the different methods for measuring the strength o f aid, which is a 
calculation to determine the degree of influence aid should have on a nation for 
comparative purposes, will answer this questioiL
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Rai suggested that simple dollar amounts are not effective in testing the influence 
of aid upon voting. Rai felt that other measures, which control for certain national 
characteristics, would provide a more accurate measurement tool. He tests aid as a part 
of gross domestic product (GDP) and aid per capita. However, each o f these methods has 
serious limitations that restrict their effectiveness.
Aid per capita is a potential measure because as John White claims nations 
receive a base amount o f support, that is different for each nation, plus an additional 
preset amount per p e r s o n . I f  White is correct, then utilizing population would help to 
offset the effects o f the extra aid amounts provided per person, allowing us to compare 
the base amounts more closely.
However, there are two main reasons not to use aid per capita as a strength of aid 
indicator. First, donors do not directly provide aid to people; instead, it goes to 
governments. ' ' Unless government leaders have the good o f every person in mind when 
m aking  decisions they would not be concerned with aid per capita; and since 
governments are concerned with winning the siq)port o f only a majority, in most cases, 
the good o f the whole is discounted. Second, if aid per capita was a vital factor in 
winning a nation’s support the United States would have to invest the bulk o f its funds 
into a few nations, such as India and China (PRC). However, this would be an irrational 
approach to maximizing global support, as it requires the sacrifice o f many nations to 
gain the support o f two, as long as aid funds remain limited. If  aid per capita is 
important, the United States should focus its funds into smaller nations, which are more 
numerous, and forgo providing aid to largCT populated states. However, this is not the 
case either as both India and the PRC receive foreign aid fi:om the United States. Given
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the previous facts, using aid per capita is not a suitable choice for the strength o f aid 
indicator.
The second strength of aid measure is aid as a portion o f GDP. For this measure, 
divide aid by total GDP, with a larger product signifying a greater strength o f aid. The 
logic o f this indicator is that if aid makes up a large portion of the GDP o f a nation it will 
strive to protect the aid, especially in the case where aid is greater than GDP. This 
counteracts the differences among nations, economically, and places the importance of 
aid in clear relief. In addition, since this data is relatively easy to assemble, it is 
accessible to policy makers in all nations. Further, building on the concepts o f the 
comparative politics models, which looks at how aid keeps a governing body in power, 
the larger the aid as a portion of the overall economy the more the government will be 
able to do to maintain citizen support, at least majority support.
W ittkopf and Sexton and Decker found no connection between voting and aid as a 
portion o f GDP. Only Rai found a coimection between the two and this was not a strong 
connection. Given these results there is no need to test voting against aid as a portion of 
GDP. Also, chapter six develops a new classifications scheme o f nations for this 
research, in the classification scheme the economic development o f nations is a primary 
factor and controls for the level o f economic development as this strength o f aid indicator 
was designed to do.
Because o f the weakness o f alternative strength o f aid indicators, it is best to use 
aggregate aid totals to compare potential influence among nations. While this is not an 
ideal measure due to the differences among nations, all attempts to construct a better 
measure have been unsuccessful. Due to the multitude o f differences between nations.
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strength of aid indicators will not be successful because they can only control for one 
variable at a time. Instead, what needs to be constructed is a classification scheme for 
nations that controls for as many important variables as possible allowing for a test 
between similar sets o f nations. Following this path eliminates the need for the strength 
of aid indicator and allows the use o f unaltered raw aid amounts. Developing this 
classification scheme will be the topic o f the next chapter.
Conclusion
In the end, there are three important conclusions for this study. First, calculating 
the amount o f aid a nation receives involves adding both military and economic aid. 
Second, total aid calculations must include loans and grants. Although loans may be less 
influential, they still exert some influoice on recipients that should not be lost Finally, 
the best strength o f aid measure is total aid. The other ways to calculate the strength o f 
aid measure fail to produce results any better then using total aid. Formula 4-1 shows 
how to rewrite the formula o f influence to incorporate these findings.
Form ula 4-1 
Influence = /  (total aid, nation, vote)
With total aid defined as all m ilitary and economic aid whether loan or grants
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CHAPTERS
VOTES
When researching votes in the United Nations there are several important issues 
to cover. First, is the United States concerned about what the United Nations does?
More specifically, is the US concerned about what the General Assembly does? If so, 
why is the US concerned? Beyond the issue of whether or not the US is concerned with 
the GA actions there is the question o f how to determine important votes for the United 
States. Finally, how to count abstentions in studies o f aid and voting? This chapter will 
cover these issues and outline how a study of American foreign aid and UN voting should 
confiront these challenges.
Does the United States Care About the United Nations?
It is an acceptable fact that the United States, along with most other nations, is 
concerned about actions of the United Nations Security Council. Since the Security 
Council is empowered to make binding decisions for the entire organization, all members 
must pay close attention to the actions this body/ However, the veto power o f the five 
permanent members insures that the Security Council can not force the United States to 
act against its will.^
While most researchers consider the Security Council important, the General 
Assembly does not share this position o f prominence. Many scholars feel the GA is
45
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unimportant since in most cases it can not make binding decisions/ If the General 
Assembly is inconsequential or, more to the point, it is viewed as inconsequential by 
policy makers, then it would be irrational for the United States to expend resources to 
alter the actions o f the body. However, it is very clear that the United States does care 
what the General Assembly does. In repeated scenes the Congress o f the United States 
has taken issue with General Assembly actions and has attempted to draw attention to US 
tools o f influence over nations in the UN. Undertaking a review o f all of these episodes 
is not feasible; however, Heliodoro Gonzalez has compiled a particularly enlightening 
narrative that reveals the depth o f US attention towards the UN.
In the early 1980s, the US Congress launched an investigation into the actions of 
nations at the UN. This investigation protested that “the United States is subject to 
irresponsible and irrelevant vilification and verbal assault.”  ^ In these hearings, the 
members o f the committee proposed that nations consistently voting against the United 
States, especially on important issues, should have their foreign aid packages altered as 
punishment.^ They felt they could show their disapproval through bilateral aid 
commitments.
The hearings are compelling evidence that the United States government is 
concerned about the actions o f UN and GA. Nations mentioned by name in the 
committee meeting were not members o f the Security Council and could only offend the 
US in the General Assembly. The investigation and ensuing report also firmly 
establishes the link between aid and voting. The members o f the committee, clearly, 
stated that the two are not separate items. The connection between aid and voting was 
made even stronger by recent Congressional actions, which ordered the annual report of
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voting habits in the UN to print the amount o f aid each nation receives next to the overall 
voting percentages.
Congress has further solidified the connection between aid and voting with Senate
Bill 141^, entered by Senator Faircloth. Section 2 subsection A o f this bill reads
Prohibition. -  Funds may not be obligated or expended in any fiscal year for 
United States assistance for a foreign country if the government o f that country 
did not cast its vote in agreement w ith the United States for at least 50 percent o f 
the recorded votes taken in sessions o f the General Assembly and Security 
Council o f the United Nations during the calendar year preceding the year in 
which the fiscal year began.
This ties aid and voting together in the m inds o f members of Congress. If  nations do not
vote with the United States then they are risking their American aid. Although this bill
did not become law, the Congress has incorporated the basic idea into other bills.
However, it does show, along with the statements firom the Congressional report above,
that Congress does care what happens in the United Nation General Assembly.
The actions o f Congress support what most scholars believe, that the United
States does take note o f GA decisions. Bailey and Davis state that “All nations pay some
heed to UN resolutions”.^  Most nations, including the United States, consider the
potential setbacks fix)m not conforming to resolutions as too great, even if  it is only a
tarnished image.
Why must all nations pay heed to UN resolutions? The more sublime political 
reasons previously alluded to are not the only important issues regarding UN resolutions. 
Procedural issues also demand a nation's attention in the GA. A brief review o f both o f 
the procedural and political reasons the GA is important will clarify this issue.
The General Assembly does possess select authority to make binding decisions 
for the entire body. The first o f these binding authorities comes in the form o f the UN
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budget. The GA assesses the budget commitment for each member nation, based on 
criteria that it outlines.^ The GA can commit nations to pay a set amount o f money into 
UN accounts. As it currently stands, over half o f the members o f the GA contribute one 
one-hundredth o f one percent o f the UN budget, while these same nations vote to force 
the United States to pay twenty-five percent o f the total budget.’ Despite the fact that 
nations can refuse to pay, which the US did, they eventual do pay the assessed fee, 
making the GA an important factor.
The GA can also order the bureaucracy of the UN to perform specific functions, 
such as fact-finding missions.^’ These orders range from compiling reports to forming ad 
hoc committees to investigate a certain issue. This may not bind a particular nation, 
except in helping to pay for it, but it can prove very embarrassing for the nation that is 
under investigation. This power to create reports and committees is a significant tool o f 
influence for the GA providing it a degree o f importance.
The most important binding power o f the GA comes fix>m a procedure known as 
‘Uniting for Peace’.*' Under Uniting for Peace the GA can assume control over an 
outbreak o f hostilities and establish directives for how to deal with the situation, 
including the deployment o f troops. Uniting for Peace can only happen if  the Security 
Council is grid locked by the veto o f one (or two) permanent members. When the 
Security Council is grid locked the GA can pass recommendations that substitute for 
Security Council directives.*^ While United for Peace resolutions take a two-thirds 
majority, they have the same weight as Security Council decisions and constitute a shift 
in power firom the Security Council to the GA. Although United for Peace has not
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happened often, it has taken place during some very important international crises such as 
the Korean Conflict, the Soviet invasion o f Hungary, and Suez Crisis.*^
Several other issues under General Assembly control are important to the United 
States despite not being binding. The first of these is that the GA elects the non­
permanent members o f the Security Council.'^ This often takes on a great deal of 
importance. While the United States may be able to block Security Council action with 
the veto, it can not authorize favorable actions without a positive vote o f the majority of 
nations. The requirement of a “positive” vote means that a majority o f the members of 
the Security Council must vote in favor o f a resolution otherwise it is defeated. Further, a 
majority of nations can defeat a resolution by abstaining, called a “hidden veto”.*^  Thus, 
in order for the United States to be able to claim it is following a UN resolution when it 
acts, it must win the support of non-permanent members as well as the permanent five 
members. If  the GA elects members that are unwilling to support American policies then 
the United States can not employ United Nations resolutions to cover its foreign policy 
goals. This has taken on greater importance in recent years as the United States has 
sought to operate under the guise of the UN, the best example of this being the Gulf War 
against Iraq.
Another very important issue is that the GA votes to accept and expel members of 
the UN. This ability is tempered by the fact the SC must make a recommendation first; 
however, the GA is the final body to vote on these issues.*^ In order for the UN to accept 
nations the United States sponsors, they must win majority support in the GA. It is 
however agreed that permanent members can veto requests to join the UN before the 
General Assembly has the opportunity to vote on admission.
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Further, the GA decides matters o f credentials, which means they determine who 
is the actual representative from a nation. Most o f  the time this is unimportant but takes 
on great relevance in certain circumstances. This is true o f the United States efforts to 
block the Peoples Republic o f China (PRC) from taking over the China seat in the UN.
In this case, the PRC applied to the GA for recognition as the rightful government of 
China and to claim its seat in the UN. Since this was a matter of representation and not 
membership, the United States could not act through the Security Council.*^ This forced 
the United States to attempt to block the entry o f the PRC through the GA by denying it 
the needed two-thirds support to win the seat.*^ In this role, the decision o f the GA took 
on great importance to the United States. Allowing an enemy to join at the same time 
expelling an ally would have been a great loss for the United States.
Finally, the GA elects the Secretary-General o f the UN.”  The Secretary-General 
is the chief executive o f all UN organs and can attend, without voting privileges, both 
Security Council and GA meetings. Again, the Security Council forwards a nomination 
to the GA for its consideration and in most cases, the GA accepts the Security Council's 
decision, but it is not bound to do so. Even if  the United States wins a vote on its 
preferred candidate a divided vote in the GA could be embarrassing for the United States, 
especially in the hands of anti-American propagandist.
Along with the procedural issues that make the GA critical there are larger 
political realities that require the United States to take notice o f what the GA does. While 
these issues are more subtle than the issues above they are still of great relevance.
The UN and GA by design bear a certain moral authority.^ ® This authority comes 
from the GA’s universal nature; it is supposed to be the representative o f all the world’s
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people. Further, the UN has a broad base o f support both in the United States, which is 
one o f the most skeptical o f nations, and in the world. Given these facts, "... most 
governments will still try to avoid a direct confrontation with, or condemnation by, the 
General Assembly.” *^ Further, since the United States attempts to wrap its foreign policy 
in moral righteousness it can not accept the condemnation o f the UN. This is especially 
true in the current Iraqi situation where the United States has taken the moral high ground 
o f iq)holding world peace and defending the weak. If  the GA ever votes against United 
States policies in the Gulf region, it would force American policy makers to put a new 
spin on events, a spin that might undermine domestic support.
Issues o f prestige also arise in the GA. Hans Morgenthau stated clearly that 
nations could not allow the tarnishing o f their prestige in international relations. Once 
this happens, other nations will view the defamed power as weak or in decline, which 
could lead to challenges for authority, which is what every hegemonic power seeks to 
avoid. Although losing an important vote in the GA is not catastrophic, it could signal 
other nations to challenge US policies through the UN. Thus, the United States expends 
great effort to avoid critical defeats, or at least to avoid losing by a large margin.^
It should be clear from the discussion above that decisions made in the General 
Assembly concern the United States. Through procedural and political issues, the GA 
can exert great influence over UN and world politics. Even though the GA is weaker 
then the Security Council, it is still important to  the United States. Due to this 
importance, the United States attempts to control certain actions taken by Goieral 
Assembly.
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Important Votes
While it is apparent that the United States cares about the actions o f the General 
Assembly, it is also apparent that not all actions vitally importance to the United States. 
Instead, a sub-group o f votes exists which critically concern the United States. Up to this 
point, researchers have made no effort to distinguish between these groups o f votes. 
W ittkopf did not distinguish between important and peripheral votes; instead testing aid 
against all votes. This section challenges the practice of not separating these votes and 
discusses guidelines for determining an important vote from an unimportant one.
W ittkopf never defended or explained his decision not to separate important 
votes, so examining his logic is not possible. Further, since all other studies relied upon 
W ittkopf no published arguments exist in favor o f separating these votes. A possible 
explanation is that since the State Department did not provide a list o f important votes 
when W ittkopf performed his study he did not feel it was a necessary issue to consider. 
Instead, this section makes the argument for differentiating the two types o f votes. This 
will lead directly to the method for determining an important vote.
As should be apparent the United States is not profoundly concerned with all 
issues attended to in the General Assembly. La fact, o f the hundreds o f votes that 
annually  take place there may be only about twenty o f vital interest. Past studies have 
asserted that if  aid wins support, increased stq)port will be evident in all actions, even if 
unimportant to the donor. However, it seems an irrational waste o f scarce resources for 
the United States to use its influence to alter votes on items o f no relevance. While 
nations may agree with the position o f the United States on these peripheral matters and 
vote with them, the United States would not waste its influence to alter these votes.
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Instead, the United States, and any donor nation, would save their influence for important 
issues. To follow Morgenthau’s analogy, donor nations would only bribe other nations 
on issues of great concern. Thus, any test o f aid and influence should place emphasis on 
the issues important to the donor.
This logic holds tme for recipient nations as well. It is irrational to expect nations 
to accept aid if they must alter all o f their actions to satisfy the donor. Instead, the 
recipients are willing to alter select actions in exchange for foreign aid. No nation would 
be willing to trade all of its sovereignty for aid, at least not for the amount o f aid that the 
United States can provide. Thus, from both perspectives it is unlikely that a donor of aid 
attempts to alter all votes in the UN. Instead, aid is a tool to influence votes on select 
issues.
How can researchers tell an important vote from a peripheral one? The best 
^proach is to rely upon individual government statements concerning what they regard 
as important votes. It is possible to design strict criteria to categorize votes as important 
or not. However, if  individual governments pressure recipient governments to act in a 
certain matter, it is the individual government’s view o f important issues that is 
consequential.
However, since a governmental agency may be under pressure to demonstrate its 
effectiveness there should be some general criteria outlined. This w ill allow researchers 
to shift through government statements and ensure that they are not receiving biased 
information slanted towards success. In addition, since, unlike the United States, not all 
nations publish their important votes these criteria are applicable to other nations.
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There are five factors to determine the relative importance o f individual issues. 
First, anything binding must be important to a nation. If  the United States is committed 
to taking certain actions by a GA resolution, it will use its influence to ensure the 
achievement o f its most favorable outcome. The best example o f this is the Uniting for 
Peace resolution. Especially since the United States no longer controls the majority in 
the General Assembly on a regular basis, it fears the use such resolutions against 
American interests.^ Budget resolutions also fall into the category o f committing 
actions. However, since these resolutions h^>pen yearly, only resolutions that drastically 
alter the funding commitments are important, under normal circumstances. Exceptions to 
this may arise if  the current United States administration is particularly anti-UN or has 
campaigned heavily to reduce the United States share o f the payments.
The second factor is if the resolution deals directly with the United States. The 
UN occasionally passes resolutions regarding American actions, such as the recent 
bombing o f Afghanistan and the Sudan. In its own defense the United States, and any 
other nation, will attempt to weaken the language in the resolution; or try to demonstrate 
that the entire UN is not against the action taken by creating a large bloc o f nations 
against the resolution. An example o f this comes fiom GA resolutions condemning the 
mining of Nicaraguan harbors by the United States in the 1980s. '^* The same premise 
would apply to any reports about domestic policy negative towards the United States.
Further, any resolution that deals with a close ally is important. The United States 
will not allow the GA to denounce an ally, because it can amount to attacking US 
pohcies. The United States demonstrates this by its continued attempts to shield Israel 
from negative resolutions debated by the GA. The United States has consistently fought
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in support o f Israel and other close allies. In the case o f Israel the United States normally 
loses, but does attempt to weaken the voting coalition against Israel.^ In 1995, the GA 
passed two such resolutions dealing with Israel, A/Res/50/73 and A/Res/50/129.^  ^
Although the United States agreed substantively with the resolutions, the United States 
believed that both resolutions attacked Israel unwarrantedly and attempted to defeat both 
o f them. This shows that the United States provides protection to its aUies, especially in 
the case o f Israel.
Any resolution concerning an enemy state is important, especially if the resolution 
condemns the state or is an attempt to end punishment against a state. The United States 
has repeatedly ensured that Saddam Hussein could not gain a political victory by having 
the GA condemn the embargo against Iraq. The United States has also vigorously fought 
criticism o f its Cuba policy.
Finally, issues o f UN reform will take on great importance to most nations and 
certainly the United States. The United States has historically viewed the UN as a tool 
for American world leadership, designed to help maintain the current world order. Any 
attempt to alter the balance o f power, in the UN or any organ such as the GA, is 
important. The United States favors only change within the current system, not changes 
to the system itself.^* Any attempt to alter the current balance o f power, as currently 
debated in regards to the Security Council, must have the approval o f the GA and would 
be significant to the United States as the global hegemonic power.
In this study, official United States government statements regarding votes w ill be 
used to determine which votes are considered as important. These statements will be 
drawn from the anniial State Department report to Congress entitled Voting Practices in
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the United Nations for the years o f this study, 1995-97, as long as they meet the general 
criteria outlined above. Appendix 1 provides a complete list and brief review o f these 
important votes.
Abstentions and Absent 
The final issue dealing with votes is how to confront nations that do not vote on a 
particular resolution. Currently there are four options for nations' vote: yes, no, abstain, 
and absent^’ Since nations do not have to choose to support a resolution directly, it is 
difficult to determine if  a vote is supportive or not, a fact that past studies have not taken 
into account, histead, they have tested whether or not a nation voted identically to the 
United States. Only when a nation voted the same way is it supporting the United States, 
if  not they were in opposition. Abstention and absence are not necessarily opposition.
The first issue to deal with is absence. If  a nation is not present at the time of 
voting then they can neither support nor oppose an issue. However, they may be absent 
to protest the vote taking place, it is something that does not happen often in the GA of 
the 1990s. Usually, when a nation is not present to vote it is due to a collapse o f 
government at home and not due to protest^® Further, when nations are absent they tend 
to miss the entire session. Any nation absent for a majority o f the votes will not be a part 
o f the sample o f nations. Absent votes will not count when figuring vote support for the 
United States if  a nation misses only few votes, unless there exists substantial evidence to 
support the claim that the nation is absent to protest the entire proceeding.
In the case o f abstentions, the issue is much less clear. Lijphart first began to 
experiment with the multiple meanings o f abstentions.^* He determined that an
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abstention is neutral, neither helping nor hurting any nation. Lijphart decided that 
abstentions should count as half a point when calculating voting agreement, an identical 
vote being one and opposite vote being zero. While this is a vast improvement over past 
conceptualizations o f abstentions, it does not fully explain how a nation may employ an 
abstention.
The GA, as with m ost legislative bodies, makes the majority o f decisions in 
private meetings, not on the floor o f the assembly.^" Nations are able to ‘count votes’ in 
advance of the public vote which is taken more for outside appearance than to resolve the 
issue. When taking a vote nations know how their vote will affect other nations, 
including those that provide them foreign aid. Thus, they can calculate if their donor 
nation is going to win an important vote or not. This allows them to abstain tactically 
when they are sure the donor nation will achieve their desired outcome. Therefore, 
whether an abstention is supportive or not, depends upon the outcome of the vote. If  the 
donor nation wins the vote, however that may be deiSned, then an abstention is supportive 
o f the donor nation. If  the donor loses the vote then an abstention becomes a non- 
supportive vote. While the recipient nation did not openly defy the donor nation, it did 
not come forward and support it either. As a result, studies comparing support and 
foreign aid must examine abstentions on an individual basis, not as a whole as past 
studies have done.
Even the design above is not perfect It is not hard to envision a scenario where a 
recipient must not oppose a  resolution for domestic pohtical reasons, but at the same time 
does not wish to conflict w ith a donor nation. Therefore, the nation chooses the middle 
ground of abstention. Yet, the abstention could be supportive, since the recipient altered
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their behavior to protect their aid. This is the quintessential definition o f influence. 
However, attempting to determine why nations take the middle ground in specific cases 
would be a massive undertaking and would most likely not alter the final results in a 
dramatic fashion due to the lower number o f occurrences. Therefore, even though the 
method for dealing with abstentions outlined in the paragraph above is not perfect, it is 
the best option for research o f this nature.
Conclusion
There are three conclusions drawn fix>m this chapter. First, the United States, and 
most nations o f the world, are concerned with the actions o f the United Nations General 
Assembly. However, the issue that is under consideration in the GA shapes this concern. 
The United States is not concerned with every issue the GA covers. Instead, it reserves 
its influence for a select sub-set o f issues that are important to US policies. Any test o f 
aid and UN voting must concentrate on these matters and not the entire array of the GA’s 
agenda. Finally, voting in the GA is not as clear as past studies have attempted to make it 
appear. Absences and abstentions make the issue of comparing votes much more 
difficult. However, it is possible to understand and employ these votes in this form of 
research with the ^plication  o f a few simple rules. In the end, it is possible to rework the 
formula of influence to include these ideas as in Formula 5-1.
Formula 5-1 
Influence = /  (total aid, important votes, nation)
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
59
Endnotes
1. Sydney D. Bailey, The Procedure o f the UN Security Council, 2d ed. (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1988), 3-5.
2. Richard Hiscocks, The Security Council: A Study in Adolescence (New York: 
The Free Press, 1973), 56.
3. Sydney D. Bailey and Sam Daws, The United Nations: A Concise Political 
Guide, 3rd ed. (London: Barnes and Noble Books, 1995), 4.
4. Heliodoro Gonzalez, “Can Foreign Aid Continue as a Growth Industry for the 
Bureaucracy? Latin American Cooperation at the United Nations,” Inter American 
Economic Affairs 37 (1983/84): 53.
5. Gonzalez, 53
6. Foreign A id Rfform Act o f1997,105th Cong., 1st sess., S R. 141.
7. Bailey and Daws 1995, 13.
8. Peter R, Baehr and Leon Gordenker, The United Nations in the 1990s, 2nd ed. 
(New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994), 56-57.
9. Bailey and Daws, 10.
10. Baehr and Gordenker, 52.
11. Hiscocks, 290.
12. Baehr and Gordenker, 74.
13. Baehr and Gordenker, 75-76.
14. Bailey 1988, 254.
15. Sydney D. Bailey, Voting in the Security Cotmcil (Bloomington, IN: Indiana 
University Press, 1969), 74.
16. Bailey and Daws, 16.
17. Bailey and Daws, 19.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
60
18. The GA deemed this issue to be an ‘important matter’ and thus required a 
two-thirds majority instead o f a normal majority.
19. Baehr and Gordenker, 28.
20. Baehr and Gordenker, 54
21. Baehr and Gordenker, 54
22. Robert W. Gregg, About Faces? The United States and the United Nations 
(Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1993), 53.
23. Baehr and Gordenker, 23.
24. Baehr and Gordenker, 27
25. James A. BiU Politics o f the Middle East (New York: Harper Collins College 
Publishers, 1994), 369.
26. United States Department of State, Bureau of hitemational Organization 
Affairs, Voting Practices in the United Nations 1995 (Washington, D.C., 1996), 39-40.
27. Gregg, 2 and 8.
28. Gregg, 9.
29. Baehr and Gordenker, 54.
30. See Gambia in 1997 for example.
31. Arend Lijphart, “The Analysis of Bloc Voting in the General Assembly: A 
Critiques and a Proposaf” American Political Science Review 57, no. 4 (1963).
32. David A. Kay, ed.. The United Nations Political System (New York: John 
WUey & Sons, INC., 1967), 104-105.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER 6
CLASSIFYING NATIONS
The final variable in the formula of influence is nations, hi order to understand 
how aid influences nations it is necessary to compare among similar nations. Early 
studies, such as W ittkopf s, treated all nations the same, then researchers began to classify 
nations to help eliminate intermediate variables interfering with the correlations. Sexton 
and Decker attempted the most complex classification scheme; however, as demonstrated 
in chapter three it contained only four different types o f nations, which is clearly an 
oversimplification. This chapter will layout a new classification scheme for the test of 
aid and UN voting.
What is Important?
What are the central factors influencing individual relations between nations? 
Specifically, what variables would lead nations to agree or disagree on issues? The 
obvious response to such a question is that it depends on the issue. However, this returns 
researchers to an overly narrow scope. What need to be established are variables that 
account for a nation’s stance on an array o f issues. Then it will be possible to classify 
nations in similar blocs to test the influence of an outside variable, such as foreign aid.
In this search for national indicators there are abundant possibilities. G eogr^hy, 
history, economic conditions, internal political structure, internal economic structure,
61
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level of development, existence o f opposition groups*, and cultural traditions are all 
variables that impact a nation’s external relations. However, if  all o f these variables were 
used to create a classification scheme every nation would comprise a group o f one 
because every nation has trademarks that no other nation shares. To avoid dividing 
nations into groups o f one requires the use o f a few significant variables to create groups 
that are large enough for internal comparisons; but narrow enough to have real meaning.
There has been little work done in this regard, perhaps because this type o f 
research falls between the sub-disciplines o f international relations and comparative 
politics. Since such work would comprise a far-reaching research project o f its own, this 
study will outline what the most probable variables are and how to employ them in 
research.
This chapter will discuss only the three most prominent variables. These are type 
o f government, geographic location, and level o f economic development. The three 
chosen variables have a great impact on the external relations o f all nations, which is the 
primary concern here. These three variables interact with most global issues and 
predispose a nation towards certain pohcy alternatives. By ignoring the natural 
dispositions o f nations, past studies assumed all nations approached votes in the UN as a 
blank slate with foreign aid deciding their vote. However, research must account for 
preset preferences and designs that every nation has when entering votes. Foreign aid 
must overcome national preferences if it is to influence voting in the United Nations.
Only by placing similar nations together will it become clear whether aid influenced 
votes.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
63
Type o f Government 
Though realist theory dictates that type o f government has no effect on a state’s 
international relations, other perspectives suggest the type o f government a nation has 
may determine its views on certain international issues/ This dispute requires some 
elaboration provided in a brief overview o f the central issues follows.
On the international level, one o f the most discussed topics is human rights. With 
the recent expansion o f this topic, it now encompasses a wide range o f issues. One of 
which is the political rights o f individuals, particularly the right to vote and have political 
representation. This issue will naturally meet with resistance from certain types o f 
governments while viewed as natural by others.
A totalitarian regime, either monarchical or dictatorial in nature, will not accept 
the idea of popular sovereignty. Allowing the nation’s citizens to vote could jeopardize 
the government’s power, or even its claim to power. Thus, when any voting rights issue 
arises in the General Assembly, totalitarian governments would likely be negatively 
predisposed towards the resolution. On the other hand, a more liberal democratic regime, 
which could include constitutional monarchs, would beheve the right to vote is 
fundamental for citizens. In this case, the government would be positively predisposed 
towards the issue and would have a natural position on the topic. This does not take into 
account the view o f second world nations that believe voting is permissible as long as the 
communist party is the only entity on the ballot
From one brief example it is clear the type of government a nation has is a very 
important variable in international relations; granted, this importance shifts depending on 
the issues. However, not controlling for this variable can distort the results o f a study of
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this nature. If  a nation such as Saudi Arabia, an absolute monarchy, votes against a 
representation resolution while Chile, a  democracy, votes for it, can these two votes be 
taken as equal in supportive value. In short, did Chile support the United States, 
assuming a positive vote, while Saudi Arabia did not? In the direct sense, Saudi Arabia 
did not support the United States but Chile did, but was the United States the critical 
factor? In this case, it is unclear due to differences in government and the philosophies 
that provide their legitimacy.
Creating an accurate classification scheme o f governments will counteract these 
differences. By classifying govermnent types, it would be possible to test the impact of 
an outside variable, such as aid, without the intermediate interference o f government 
types. In short, it would be possible to test the realist theory of aid on more homogenous 
sets o f nations.
However, an appropriate classification scheme is not obvious. The first attempt in 
aid studies at this type o f classification had only two types o f govermnents, totalitarian 
and non-totalitarian.^ This is clearly an over-simplification and fails to achieve anything. 
For example, it classifies nations such as Saudi Arabia and the People’s Republic of 
China as totalitarian. Clearly, these nations do not share the same natural governmental 
dispositions, especially since the latter governments political philosophy calls for 
overthrowing o f the former. The non-totalitarian category in turn overlooks such 
differences as presidential versus parliamentary systems and direct vs. indirect elections, 
all o f which could have an impact depending on the issue. In addition, it becomes very 
difScult to determine what is non-totalitarian. No government claims to be a totalitarian 
regime and the difference is not always easy to qualify.
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Past works on voting blocs support these logical arguments. Although they do not 
perfectly match the topic at hand, they do follow the basic idea. These studies attempt to 
determine the reasons behind the existence of voting blocs by determining the 
characteristic that defines blocs. For example, Hovet does not discuss the existence of 
any blocs based on type o f government. The closest type discussed by Hovet is 
“Common Interest Groups”, which are economic and colonial based groups, not 
political.** Lijphart’s voting bloc study does not identify a connection between types of 
government and voting. Despite the fact that his study did not set out to test this 
proposition directly, it is clear from the data that government type was not a signification 
factor.
Finally, a review of current blocs in the United Nations supports the findings from 
Hovet and Lijphart The are no current blocs in the United Nations associated by type of 
government. In fact, when reporting voting practices in the United Nations the US 
Department o f State does not separate voting by government type. They employ a 
variety o f other separating techniques such as geography and cultural factors, but without 
any attempt to explore governmental differences.^
Due to these immense difGculties, there will be no classification by government 
type. While it is true that government type does affect a nation’s voting in the United 
Nations on select issues, these topics will not arise under this study because the types of 
issues that government classification would impact will not rise to the level o f important 
resolutions for the United States as outlined in chapter five. It is clear finm the history of 
American foreign policy that ensuring everyone the right to vote is not o f major concern; 
in fact, the United States has long siqiported and defended undemocratic regimes.^
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Geography
Geography in a strict sense can provide the researcher with a great deal o f 
knowledge about a particular nation. Due to the overlap o f many important factors, such 
as common history, culture, and linguistic traits, the geographic location o f a nation is a 
strong indicator o f a nation’s characteristics. However, the definition o f geography is 
broader for this research. The purpose o f the geographic indicator is to signify major 
political subdivisions in the world.^
This is not an over extension o f the term geography. In his groundbreaking 
research on UN bloc politics, Thomas Hovet discovered that geographic groupings are 
very similar to caucus groups inside the GA. He further determined that most subgroups 
in the UN closely resembled geographic groupings.* Based on this research, it is possible 
to place nations into homogenous geographic groups, without performing in-depth 
studies o f each individual nation.
There are two important points o f clarification before dividing the nations into 
these sub-groups. First, Hovet found that the issue under consideration was very 
important to the creation of these subdivisions.^ Although this is a  serious research issue, 
it appears that apart from a microanalysis o f single votes there is little to do to correct it. 
However, the second criteria for classifying nations, economic development, will provide 
a control for issues related to breakdowns of group cohesiveness, especially since the 
major issues in the GA o f the 1990s concern economic issues. Second, Hovet’s 
classification scheme is very old, designed in the middle o f the Cold War. In fact, one of 
his groupings no longer exists, the Eastern Bloc. Due to changes that have occurred over 
time making adaptations to Hovet’s scheme will update it for the modem UN. The
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placement of nations in these political subdivisions occupies the rest o f this section. 
Provided in this chapter is a brief overview and a full listing o f all categories is available 
in Appendix 2.
It is important to remember in this process that the purpose o f this division is to 
place nations into homogenous sub-fields. While these sub-fields will follow traditional 
geographic lines there are special cases placed in different geographic categories or 
separated into categories o f their own. The reasons for these changes are different with 
every case but share one common theme. The geographic designation is more than 
location, it groups nations having the same regional outlook, strategic concerns, and 
broadly speaking, cultural backgrounds. Nations singled out for special treatment, or 
placed in different sub-categories, have important idiosyncrasies deserving individual 
attention.
The first geogr^hic category is Latin America. This category consists o f all 
nations from Mexico to Argentina and the Caribbean states. It may seem prudent to place 
Cuba outside this grouping given its adversarial relationship with the United States, a 
relationship that is not currently shared by other Latin American nations, at least not to 
the same degree. However, the conflict with the United States is the only major 
difference between Cuba and the rest of the Latin American nations. Although important 
to keep in m ind when ex a m in in g  the results o f this study, the Cuba-American rivalry is 
not sufScient to place Cuba in a separate category.
The second geogn^hic category is Western Europe. This category includes 
Canada, Greenland, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Greece, and all other European nations 
that were not under Soviet domination during the Cold War. While the Cold War status
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o f each nation is not an important factor, it is the point o f demarcation between two 
drastically different groups. Despite the fact that Eastern European nations desire to join 
the ranks o f the Western European nations they have not reached that point yet and that 
represents a clear division between East and West Europe. This division is important 
enough to warrant the creation separate groups. If  the United States were not the donor 
under study in this research, it would be located within the Western Europe category.
The third grouping is Eastern Europe. This group includes the former Soviet Bloc 
countries, including the new nations that have formed out of Yugoslavia, the Baltic 
States, Ukraine, Belarus, and Russia. While Russia does extend into the Asian region its 
historical background is European and not Asian making it fit better with the Eastern 
European grouping.
The fourth geographic group is the Middle East and North Afiica. While this 
region includes many nations, running from Morocco in the west to Kazakhstan in the 
East, these nations have similar background, especially religion. Clarify this region 
requires an in-depth explanation o f its confines. It starts with Morocco in the west and 
continuing across the top of Africa to Egypt It also includes the traditional Middle East, 
which extends from the Arabian Peninsula north to Turkey and then across to Iran. For 
this research, the region will also include the starts (or homelands) created by the coU^se 
o f the Soviet Union as well as Afghanistan. Despite the fact that these nations are not 
traditionally associated with the Middle East, share strong similarities.
There are two nations in the Middle East/North Africa grouping to separate for 
individual treatment. The first is Israel, which does not share many common features 
with its surrounding neighbors. In fact, one o f the common features of countries in this
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region is support o f the Palestinians against Israel, hicluding Israel in comparisons o f 
this region would skew any results; instead, the correct placement for Israel is with the 
Western European category. The other nation that requires special consideration is 
Turkey. Although Muslim and Arabic, Turkey has strong connections with Europe, even 
joining NATO. This would alter its voting in the General Assembly compared to other 
nations in this region. Similar to the solution for Israel, the correct placement for Turkey 
is with the Western European category.
The fifth geographic group o f nations is South Africa. This group consists of 
nations on the African continent that do not fall into the Middle East and North African 
group with the addition o f Madagascar. Sub-Saharan nations, traditionally grouped 
together in classification schemes, posses shared histories and concerns make them a 
natural category for broad ranging comparisons. In this region, the only nation requiring 
special attention is South Africa. While it has changed rapidly over the past ten years, it 
still does not belong with other African nations. Its strong European background and 
minority population gives South Africa a very distinctive outlook and unusual 
connections to other nations that alters their voting in the General Assembly. Further, the 
fact South Africa is the only African nation possessing nuclear weapons makes it even 
more unsuited for the sub-Saharan African category. Following other studies, therefore.
South Africa will be in the Western European category. Although not a perfect match, 
the Western European group is the best choice fiar South Africa. ' *
The sixth geographic grouping o f nations is the Indian Subcontinent. This region 
will consist o f the nations o f Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh. This is a rather 
small grouping o f nations, but a necessary one. These nations share unique
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characteristics and historical experiences that would make them peculiar in either the 
Middle East category or the Asian Pacific category. The past British dominance, 
religious diversity, and intense conflicts gives these nations a singular outlooks that 
would have an impact on their support levels for different policies.
The seventh, and final, category consists o f mainland Asia and the Pacific Region. 
This group consists o f the nations occupying the rest o f the Eur-Asian landmass and the 
island nations of the Pacific. This group stretches fiom Australia in the South to 
Mongolia in the North and runs from Western China to the western coast o f the North 
and South American continents. These nations share a long history o f interaction and 
cultural similarities. They also share distinctive security concerns making them a natural 
grouping. Inside the Asia Pacific category, the Anzus nations, Australia and New 
Zealand, do not share the com m on background o f the other nations in the group. Their 
historical and cultural backgrounds are Western European in origin. Even though they 
share the security concerns o f nations in the region, they are too different to classify with 
the Asia Pacific group. Instead, the Anzus nations belong in the category o f Western 
European.
Despite not following traditional geographic breakdowns, this geographic 
classification scheme does provide a better ty po lo ^  for studying nations. With this 
classification, it is possible to study the impact o f aid upon nations possessing similar 
political attitudes and agendas. These groupings divide the nations o f  the world into 
homogenous groups making a true comparison between UN votes and aid possible. The 
final intermediate variable research can control for is different levels o f economic 
development inside each category.
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Economie Differences 
The division o f nations into regional categories creates broad homogeneous 
groups for comparing aid and UN voting. However, it is not perfect. There are other 
intermediate variables that interfere with the study. The variable o f greatest importance 
is level of economic development among nations. In each o f the regional categories exist 
diverse economic development levels. This diversity affects issues a nation will support 
in the United Nations. Developing nations favor redistributive programs while developed 
counterparts support these programs less. Further, this research theorized that less 
developed nations experience a stronger need to ensure continuation o f their foreign aid 
donations. Since developing nations command fewer resources they must rely upon 
outside assistance to develop economically. To protect their foreign aid donations, 
developing nations should perceive greater pressure than developed nations to vote with 
donor. To control for effects from economic development, the level o f economic 
development o f each nation will further divide them inside o f each geographic category.
The economic categorization uses the individual nation’s gross domestic product 
(GDP) per c ^ ita . This provides a true estimate of economic development for each 
nation. Using pure GDP does not work because it only provides total amount o f 
production o f a nation without controlling for demands placed upon production by 
citizens of the nation. Dividing the GDP by total population o f a nation controls for these 
demands on production, while at the same time controlling for size variations among 
nations. GDP per capita provides the average amount o f production each citizen can 
consume, a statistic comparable between nations and between points in time. It is 
important to note that not all experts believe GDP per capita is an appropriate measure o f
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a nation’s economic development. Dogan and Kazancigil state that national averages are 
not good statistics to employ because there is too much variance among nations and their 
reporting methodology.'^ Dogan and Kazancigil further state that GDP is imperfect 
because it does not include the '"Black Economy”, unreported work and sales, that exists 
in every nation.'** However, they do not offer an alternative method for determining 
economic development levels o f a nation. They propose a complex index o f multiple 
variables, but never create one. Although GDP per capita is not perfect, it is the best 
alternative for comparing economic development among nations.
For this study, there are three classifications o f economic development. These 
represent modifications o f the classification scheme currently employed by the World 
Bank. The World Bank has four categories o f nations divided as follows. The first 
category is low income and comprises nations with per capita Gross National Product 
(GNP) o f725 dollars or less. The second category is lower-middle income and consists 
o f nations between 726 and 2,895 dollars per person. The third category is upper-middle 
income and covers the range between 2,896 and 8,955 dollars. The final category is high 
income and covers nations with per c ^ ita  GNP greater that 8,956 dollars.'^
This study combines the first two categories, low and lower middle, to form one 
low-income category. There are two essential reasons for doing this. First, the difference 
between the two categories is m in im al; each represents the least developed nations o f the 
world. Neither o f the categories signifies an economy that is meeting the needs of the 
nation’s population. While it is useful for the purposes o f the World Bank to divide 
nations in this manner, it will not aid this study to divide these nations. Second, using 
four categories would reduce the number o f nations in each category, which will not
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allow for adequate comparisons. Sub-dividing each regional category into three fields 
will allow for a large enough number o f nations in each field for comparative purposes, 
h i addition, this study uses GDP instead of GNP. The use o f GDP is necessary because it 
measures only production occurring inside a particular nation’s boundaries, while 
excluding the production o f citizens located in other nations.'^ This provides an accurate 
picture o f resources available to a nation, which makes it the better indicator.
Conclusion
This chapter provided a brief review of the important characteristics o f nations, as 
it pertains to voting in the UN. The list o f potential important characteristics has been 
narrowed to two, geographic region and economic development, that provide for 
homogeneous groupings o f nations without creating overly restrictive criteria. While 
there are many more potential variables for the classification scheme they would not 
clarify the results, but rather would make comparisons impossible by forming too narrow 
o f categories. In the end, this chapter creates a concise classification scheme, using as 
few variables possible, capturing the essential charactaistics o f each nation to allow for a 
test of a nation’s response to foreign aid. Formula 6-1 shows the formula o f influence 
rewritten to incorporate these findings.
Formula 6-1
Votes = /  (total aid, important votes, economic/geographic category of a nation)
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CHAPTER?
CONCLUSION
Before presenting the results of this study there is a brief review o f the issues 
covered, with emphasis placed on how this research differs from other voting and aid 
studies. Following the presentation o f the results is a discussion o f the policy 
implications along with possible alterations for future research on aid and United Nations 
voting.
Review
Chapter one previews this work outlining the general question and methods of 
research. C huter two reviews the theories concerning why nations provide foreign aid in 
order for the reader to fully understand the different aspects o f the foreign aid issue and to 
place this work among the volumes o f research performed in the past. This study places 
heavy emphasis on international relations theories o f aid, which serve as the theoretical 
tool o f this study, as elaborated by Hans Morgenthau. Chapter three reviews relevant 
studies performed on aid and United Nations voting with specific attention on the 
weakness o f these studies and how to improve the older designs.
Chapter four covered the question o f how to define and count foreign aid. It 
establishes why military and economic aid must be included in any study involving aid as
76
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well as the need to count both loans and grants as part o f a nation’s aid package. In 
addition, this chapter reviews the weakness of the strength of aid indicators developed by 
Rai, establishing that raw aid amounts are the best tool for measuring the impact o f aid 
upon recipient nations. Chapter five covers the issue o f votes in the United Nations. An 
important part o f this chapter is the establishment o f the need to use important votes, as 
defined by the donor nation, when studying the connection between aid and voting. 
Further, this chapter explores the multiple meanings o f abstentions, determining the need 
to explore individual votes before deciding whether an abstention is supportive or not. 
Finally, chapter six outlines a new method for classifying nations in order to test the 
impact o f aid within similar groups o f nations. The base o f this classification scheme is a 
nation’s geographic location and level o f economic development.
1997 Results
After conducting the test o f aid and voting as specified in the previous chapters, it 
is apparent that there is no clear answer to whether aid influences voting. The cases 
smdied provide mixed results with certain classifications o f nations showing no 
connection between aid and voting while others demonstrate a weak correlation. Despite 
the fact that some o f the results that follow do present evidence to the contrary, it appears 
the hypothesis that American foreign aid wins votes in the United Nations G aieral 
Assembly is incorrect
To demonstrate the results o f the test it is necessary to explore each geographic 
region separately, ordered by strength o f results, with the nations’ level o f economic 
developmoit denoted in each case. Since the results fiom each year studied, 1995-1997,
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are almost identical this chapter will only present the graphs for 1997. The graphs for the 
other two years are available in Appendix 3 for comparison and the data for each 
category is available in Appendix 2.
The first region is the Asia Pacific. As is clear from Graph 7-1 voting patterns in 
comparison to aid levels is almost random. There is no strong pattern among the points 
together or divided by level o f economic development. As is also clear, the line o f best 
fit for the low developed nations in this region is nearly straight. This indicates nations 
vote with the United States at the same rate, regardless o f the amount o f aid received.'
REGION: Asia Pacific
80
. 2
<)
1
CO
70 ;►»i►
« 2 60* ( o
•a
3 1tooS
3
••S’
50 o
at >
V1
1•c
40
30
o
CL
i
20
►
S
A
Economic Development 
a Middle 
o Low 
o High
lO  20 30 40 50 60
Total Aid 
Graph 7-1
While the economic development o f the nations does not appear to play a strong 
role in voting  for the lower and middle group, it does seem to have an inq)act on the
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higher developed category. Two o f the three high developed nations vote with the United 
States over eighty percent o f the time. Although not compelling by itself, it does lend 
support to controlling for the level o f economic development.
The second region o f study is Eastern Europe. Again, the results are nearly 
random with a tendency towards a negative correlation between aid and voting. The line 
of best fit for the low economic group is slightly positive, demonstrating a weak 
connection between aid and voting. While the middle group’s line o f best fit is sharply 
negative, however there are too few points to be reliable.^ Again, the tendency is against 
any correlation with level o f economic development important but not decisive.
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The third category is Western Europe. As is evident fiom Graph 7-3^ there are 
not enough nations receiving aid in Western Europe to allow any firm conclusions to be
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diawn.^ This graph (along with 7-2) does present one important piece o f information; 
geogrsq)hy does make a difference. In both of the graphs the lower bounds are at fifty 
percent support and above, meaning that all European nations support the United States 
over half the time. European nations vote with the United States at a much greater rate 
than most regions despite the fact most do not receive foreign aid. The regional variable 
is an important ingredient in United Nations voting; however, it is not dom in a n t.
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The fourth category is Latin America. In Latin America, the correlation between 
aid and voting is in the predicted direction. Both lines o f best fit move in a positive 
direction. However, the line for the middle developed group has too few points o f data to 
be accepted. The line for the lower income group, based on a wider number o f cases.
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does represent a valid measurement o f aid and voting. As is clear however, it is flat;
indicating a constant voting rate regardless of level o f aid received.
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The nations o f the Indian Subcontinent comprise the fifth region in this study. 
However, there are only four nations in the sample, which is inadequate to draw firm 
conclusions. Despite being too small, this grouping should not merge with other groups; 
its uniqueness demands its continued separation. Combining this group with another 
would distort the impact of aid and voting for the new enlarged grouping, which is 
exactly what this research sought to avoid by dividing the nations.
Despite the small size o f the Indian Subcontinent group, it is ^>parent that there is 
no connection between aid and voting. The line o f best fit is negatively sloped. Further, 
the nation that receives the most aid tied for the lowest percentage o f supportive votes, 
which is directly counter to expectations.
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The Middle East/North Africa is the sixth group in the study. This group displays 
the strongest correlation between aid and voting so far. In the Middle East, both lines of 
best fit move in the predicted direction with the greatest strength.^ However, as in the 
case o f Latin America the line for the middle income group relies upon too few points. 
However, unlike the Latin American groiq) the line of best fit for the poor nations is not 
fiat, which shows there is some coimection between aid and voting. While not strong, the 
connection is discernible. It is important to note that poor nations in this region are non­
oil producing states, most o f which have large populations. Thus, these governments 
have to provide for a large population without the benefit o f a reliable source o f income. 
This could account for an increased reliance on foreign aid that allows donor nations 
greater influence.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
83
REGION: Middle East/North Africa
c
.2
II
•S
to
3
¥
0
1
•co
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
0
o o 
o
o  - y i  -
/t  '  ^^ - XT :
X
y
Economic Development 
o Middle 
o Low 
o High
20 40 60 80 100
Total Aid 
Graph 7-6
The final region is South Africa, and it posses the strongest correlation between 
aid and voting. As is seen in Graph 7-7 the line of best fit for the middle group moves in 
the wrong direction. Again, the line for this group in not based on enough points to 
consider reliable. However, the line for the lower developed nations is reliable and 
moving in the correct direction. Further, the diagram as a whole demonstrates the general 
tendency to move from left to right and bottom to top, which is what should happen if a 
linkage between aid and voting exists. However, the connection is still weak.
While a complete explanation o f the deviation o f South Afiica is not possible 
here, there is one fact that might explain the stronger findings in this region. The nations 
o f South Afiica are among the poorest on the face o f the earth. The level o f poverty in 
these nations may be so great as to force governments to secure aid at any cost, thus
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making the pressure to vote with a donor, such as the United States, extreme. It may be 
the case that excessively poor nations perceive the need to vote with donor nations while 
more developed nations, that are still low in development status, do not. The findings in 
the lower developed nations of the Middle East/North Afiica grouping support this 
explanation. Extreme poverty may be a strong factor in recipient support for donors.
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hi the end, there are six valid sets o f data, with the Indian Sub-continent being too 
small for any conclusions. Of the six three show signs o f aid and voting being linked, 
however the connection is minimal in one case, with only the Afiican region showing any 
true correlation between aid and voting in the predicted direction. The remaining three 
cases all show the correlation between aid and voting to be negative or non-existent
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Thus, the only conclusion to draw from this study is that aid does not win support from 
nations in the United Nations General Assembly.
While there ^ipears to be no connection between foreign aid received and support 
for the United States in the United Nations there is a connection between aid and a 
nations decision to abstain from voting. Chapter five hypothesized that nations would 
use abstentions tactically to avoid voting against an important resolution to the donor 
United States. The evidence supports this assumption and the need to reevaluate the 
meaning o f abstentions. When national support percentages were adjusted based on their 
abstentions for issues the United States was successful in winning, 74% of the nations 
receiving aid in 1997 had their rates o f support increase. Even more impressive is the 
fact that if  European nations are not counted the rate rises to 87%. This evidence is not 
decisive but does indicate that recipient nations use abstention to avoid voting against the 
United States on issues they can not openly support or advocate.
Policy Implications
The implications for American foreign policy, especially foreign aid policy, are 
clear. If Congress expects aid should win votes in the United Nations, as shown in the 
fifth chapter, then they must explicitly state the connection between aid and voting. Even 
beyond the Congress, the American government as a whole must make the connection 
clear at every possible opportunity. Only unified action between the Congress and the 
executive will be able to make nations realize what the United States expects in exchange 
for foreign aid, assuming that votes are a true priority.
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Congress has moved in this direction by printing the amount o f total aid received 
by a nation next to its voting percentage in the State Department’s armual report to 
Congress regarding voting in the United Nations. However, they have not accompanied 
this action with a straightforward statement such as the one proposed by Senator 
Faircloth. Only this form o f blatant action will create the results presumably desired by 
Congress.
Further, the United States must realize that aid appears more suited to avoid 
opposition to policies than to wiiming support for them. Nations seem less willing to 
support American policies that are not in their best interest, but inclined to avoid openly 
opposing the United States on these same issues. Employed tactically, and with the aid 
o f a large enough coalition in the General Assembly, the United States will be able to 
ensure the passage, or defeat, o f its important resolutions.
Future Research
Adjustments in any research design can sharpen results; further, changing 
circumstances might alter the outcome o f this research. W hile it is impossible to cover 
all the issues, a review o f the significant topics for future research is important and 
provided here.
First, this type o f study needs repeating in the future to determine if the passage of 
time will alter the outcomes. This research in not static, it is constantly changing and the 
conclusions o f today will not be the same tomorrow. As Congress has moved, ever so 
slightly, to make the coimection between aid and voting more concrete, nations around 
the world may begin to reconsider their voting practices in the United Nations. Since the
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Congress has only recently begun making these changes, they have not had time to have 
an impact y e t Further, as the international system moves farther away from the Cold 
War, and into a new currently undefined system, the importance of foreign aid or United 
Nations decisions may increase causing a shift in national behavior. Either o f these 
possibilities, or a combination, could lead to a new reality in global politics and cause the 
link between aid and United Nations voting to become clear. Ignoring this issue in the 
future because o f the results o f this and other studies would be unwarranted.
Second, this research does show that economic development levels o f recipient 
nation affects its voting in the United Nations. Unfortunately, the current methods for 
categorizing development do not allow for a full exploration o f this issue. There is still a 
need for better ways to classify development that will more clearly define a nation’s 
status and allow nations to be broken into smaller groups for comparisons.
Third, efforts must continue to understand the various uses o f a vote o f abstention. 
In this study, the employment o f a very simple model demonstrated that nations could use 
abstentions tactically. A more complex model needs to be developed that includes the 
possibility o f the United States using aid to influence nations to abstain on votes it loses; 
which might cause the resolution to lose moral authority, assuming the abstaining block 
is large. It might also be helpful to limit the number o f abstentions that are incorporated. 
This would entail adjusting national support figures for only those votes that the number 
of abstaining nations is large enough to alter the outcome o f the vote.
Finally, there is a need for a research effort that takes a more macro approach 
instead o f studies focusing on votes of individual nations. It is clear finm data presented 
above that the majority o f nations vote with the United States a majority o f the time. This
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ensures that the United States wins more important votes than it loses. This fact clouds 
the results because nations are clustered together very tightly m ak in g  m in o r  deviations 
statistically significant. Instead o f focusing on individual nation’s percentages it may be 
more instructive to explore how the United Nations as a whole votes and aggregate 
foreign aid increases or decreases. In other words, does more aid flowing to United 
Nations members secure the will o f the United States overall, rather than among 
individu a ls? This o f course would require a completely new methodology and data 
covering the entire history o f the United Nations instead o f just a few years. By changing 
the focus o f the research, to the United States winning overall votes instead o f individual 
nation’s votes, the relationship between aid and voting may become clear.
Final Remarks
At the beginning o f this research, there were two central questions to answer.
Why do nations provide foreign aid and Does aid influence voting in the General 
Assembly? This design has provided the clearest answer yet to whether or not aid 
influences voting. Clearly, the answer is that aid and voting are not connected. While 
this iq>holds the work o f past researchers, the conclusion o f this work are based on a more 
detailed analysis than has been attempted in the past allowing for a firm dismissal, for 
now, o f the idea that aid alters voting in the General Assembly.
Unfortunately, there is no answer for why nations provide foreign aid. This work 
does not disprove the intonational relations theory that aid is a tool o f influence. It is 
possible the exercise o f influence takes place in many other policy areas not covered
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here. W hat is safe to conclude is that foreign aid does not secure votes in the United 
Nations or if  designed for this purpose, it is not an effective instrument.
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Endnotes
1 There is no line of best fit for the middle or high economic groups due to the 
fact they do not receive any aid. Their lines are vertical.
2 The high category is constant and does not have a line o f best fit.
3 Do to distortions caused to the graph. Graph 7-3 excludes Israel.
4 The data does not allow for a line o f best fit for this graph.
5 Do to distortions caused to the graph. Graph 7-6 excludes Egypt.
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APPENDIX 1
1995 Important Votes
1. A/Res/50/9 -  Concerning International Atomic Energy Agency and its involvement 
with the establishment o f safeguards agreements with the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea. Also, calls o f both the DPRK and Iraq to come into compliance 
widi IAEA agreements.
2. A/Res/50/10 -  Calls on the United States to refiain from the embargo o f Cuba.
3. A/Res/50/21 -  Welcomes recent attempts and designs o f the Middle East Peace 
Process.
4. A/Res/50/38 -  Calls o f colonial adm in istrative powers to hold elections in their 
territories to determine the wishes o f the people o f their territories regarding their 
political future.
5. A/Res/50/71 -  Calls on Israel and all Middle East nations to renounce nuclear 
weapons and accept the Treaty on Non-Proliferation o f Nuclear Weapons.
6. A/Res/50/96 -  Urges all nations to stop any coercive measures (political or economic) 
against developing nations.
7. A/Res/50/129 — States that Israeli settlements in Palestinian territory are illegal.
8. A/Res/50/140 — Reaffirms the right o f Palestinian people to self-determination.
9. A/Res/50/185 -  Confirms the role o f the United Nations in aiding nations in 
m aintain ing  firee and fair elections.
10. A/Res/50/188 -  Expresses concern regarding human rights in fran.
11. A/Res/50/191 -  Condenms human rights abuses in fraq.
12. A/Res/50/193 -  Condemns human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia.
13. A/Res/50/197 -  Express concern regarding human rights in Sudan.
91
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14. A/Res/50/198 -  Calls on Cuba to pennit United Nations officials to perform their 
duties in Cuba and to allow the people political rights such as assembly and 
repression.
15. A/Res/50/199 -  Condemns human rights abuses in Nigeria, particularly the execution 
o f Ken Saro-Wiwa.
1996 Important Votes
1. A/Res/51/17 -  Calls on all states to end any measures regarding an embargo o f Cuba.
2. A/Res/51/22 -  Calls on all nations to end any coercive economic or political actions.
3. A/Res/51/29 -  Welcomes the Middle East Peace process that has started.
4. A/Res/51/45M -  Note the International Court of Justice’s opinion regarding the legal 
use of nuclear weapons.
5. A/Res/51/45S -  Calls on all states to negotiate an agreement to ban anti-persormel 
landmines.
6. A/Res/51/82 -  R eaffirm s the Palestinian peoples right to self-determination.
7. A/Res/51/106-Condemns human rights abuses in fraq.
8. A/Res/51/107 -  Expresses concern regarding human rights abuses in Iran.
9. A/Res/51/112 -  Expresses concern regarding human rights in Sudan.
10. A/Res/51/113 - Calls on Cuba to permit United Nations officials to perform their 
duties in Cuba and to allow the people political rights such as assembly and 
expression.
11. A/Res/51/116 - Condemns human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia.
12. A/Res/50/245 -  Adopts the Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.
1997 Important Votes
1. A/Res/52/10 - Calls on all states to end any measures regarding an embargo of Cuba.
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2. A/Res/52/11 - Concerning International Atomic Energy Agency and its involvement 
with the establishment o f safeguards agreements with the Democratic People’s 
Republic o f Korea.
3. A/Res/52/38H -  Calls on all states to intensify efforts to eliminate anti-persormel 
landmines.
4. Motion -  Procedural motion to have a separate vote for conferring on the Palestine 
Liberation Organization the same rights and privileges o f member states, except 
voting and candidature.
5. A/Res/52/114 - Reaffirms the Palestinian peoples right to self-determination.
6. A/Res/52/129 - Confirins the role of the United Nations in aiding nations in 
m ain ta in in g  free and fair elections.
7. A/Res/52/136 -  Reaffirms the rights of all people to develop.
8. A/Res/52/140 -  Express concern regarding human rights violations in Sudan.
9. A/Res/52/141 - Condemns human rights abuses in fraq.
10. A/Res/52/142/ - Expresses concern regarding human rights violations in Iran.
11. A/Res/52/143 - - Calls on Cuba to permit United Nations officials to perform their 
duties in Cuba and to allow the people political rights such as assembly and 
expression.
12. A/Res/52/147 - Condemns human rights abuses in the former Yugoslavia.
13. A/Res/52/181 - Calls on all nations to end any coercive economic or political actions.
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APPENDIX 2
1995 1996 1997
Country Aid* Votes %** Aid* 
Latin America
Votes %** Aid* Vote
Antigua 0 57.1 0 66.6 0 66.7
Argentina 0.6 60 0.588 66.6 0.6 69.2
Bahamas 0-7 60 0.816 72.7 1.1 69.2
Barbados 0 60 0 66.6 0 66.7
Belize 3.9 60 1.239 66.6 1.248 66.7
Bolivia 69.2 60 80.474 66.6 97.69 69.2
Brazil 9.1 60 5.167 66.6 13.605 69.2
Chile 6.5 57.1 1.955 66.6 1.684 69.2
Colombia 27.9 60 16.213 66.6 30.6 61.5
Costa Rica 6.3 61.5 2.137 60 1.127 69.2
Cuba 0 35.7 0 41.6 0 38.5
Ecuador 14.5 60 13.185 66.6 15.533 69.2
El Salvador 63.6 60 27.757 72.7 30.738 72.7
Grenada 0 692 0 72.7 0 69.2
Guatemala 39.2 66.7 31.496 70 38.176 69.2
Guyana 5.8 60 3.205 66.6 3.672 69.2
Haiti 160.5 60 123.667 72.7 97.373 66.7
Honduras 30 60 27.871 72.7 28.789 66.7
Jamaica 24.1 60 14.407 66.6 14.371 69.2
Mexico 10.4 60 5.433 66.6 24.216 69.2
Nicaragua 31.3 57.1 22.076 70 23.258 72.7
P anam a 5.3 60 4.982 66.6 4.259 75
Paraguay 4.8 57.1 4.301 66.6 8.232 69.2
Peru 131.9 60 92.507 66.6 99.844 69.2
Suriname 0.4 60 0.817 66.6 1.017 66.7
Trinidad and Tobago 0.2 67.1 0 66.6 0.1 69.2
Uruguay 2.4 60 1.58 72.7 1.096 69.2
Venezuela 1.1 60 0.928 66.6 0.95 69.2
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Australia 0 66.7 0 66.6 0 69.2
Austria 0 66.7 0 66.6 0 69.2
Belgium 0 66.7 0 81.8 0 69.2
Canada 0 66.7 0 75 0 76.9
Cyprus 0 53.3 15 66.6 15 69.2
Denmaric 0 66.7 0 66.6 0 76.9
Finland 0 66.7 0 66.6 0 76.9
France 0 66.7 0 75 0 69.2
Germany 0 66.7 0 75 0 69.2
Greece 229.6 60 0.054 50 0.025 69.2
Iceland 0 66.7 0 63.6 0 76.9
Italy 0 66.7 0 75 0 69.2
Liechtenstein 0 66.7 0 66.6 0 69.2
Malta 0.1 60 0.3 66.6 0.1 69.2
Monaco 0 71.4 0 75 0 69.2
Netherlands 0 66.7 0 75 0 76.9
New Zealand 0 66.7 0 66.6 0 69.2
Norway 0 66.7 0 66.6 0 76.9
Portugal 0.5 60 0.769 75 0.8 692
Republic of Ireland 39.2 66.7 19.6 66.6 19.6 69.2
South Africa 100.4 53.3 118.51 63.6 79.457 53.8
Spain 0.1 60 0.049 75 0 69.2
Sweden 0 66.7 0 66.6 0 76.9
Turicey 495.3 57.1 34.995 66.6 28.3 54.5
United Kingdom 0 73.3 0 75 0 76.9
Eastern Europe
Albania 31.4 60 21.577 75 28.978 70
Belarus 11.2 60 4.879 66.6 5.31 53.8
Bulgaria 38.9 60 29.728 66.6 33.452 69.2
Croatia 12.4 69.2 14.513 70 11.35 69.2
Czech Republic 20 66.7 5.542 75 1.281 76.9
Estonia 3.3 75 0.386 66.6 0.5 75
Hungary 26.8 66.7 17.349 75 16.428 69.2
Latvia 7.2 71.4 3.768 66.6 3.5 69.2
Lithuania 23.2 66.7 8.088 66.6 7.5 69.2
Macedonia 13.6 60 13.409 75 16.3 69.2
Poland 86.5 71.4 48.187 75 43.608 69.2
Romania 39.6 60 30.709 75 35.086 69.2
Russia 353.5 53.3 112.306 66.6 100.138 61.5
Slovak Republic 29.2 66.7 17.141 75 17.135 692
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Slovenia 3.6 60 1.016 75 0.4 69.2
Ukraine 179.5 60 144255 63.6 228.411 69.2
Middle East/North Africa
Afghanistan 12.4 45.5 15.2 50 13.6 30
Algeria 0.1 60 0.075 66.6 0.075 61.5
Armenia 52.5 50 76.531 50 96.104 54.5
Azerbaijan 9.8 45.5 11 66.7 16.43 54.5
Bahrain 0.1 64.3 0.108 80 0.125 66.7
Iran 0 26.7 0 20 0 33.3
Jordan 21.8 64.3 110.002 58.3 47.138 61.5
Kazakhstan 40.2 60 21.365 66.6 37.796 69.2
Kuwait 0 61.5 0 72.7 0 58.3
Kyrgyz Republic 25.2 58.3 12.874 66.6 21.416 66.7
Lebanon 13.8 50 0.474 58.3 12.55 63.6
Libya 0 20 0 18.1 0 25
Morocco 15.8 57.1 17.651 63.6 18.244 58.3
Oman 0.1 46.2 0.119 54.5 0.15 50
Qatar 0 46.2 0 55.5 0 41.7
Saudi Arabia 0 50 0 63.6 0 46.2
Syria 0 28.6 0 33.3 0 33.3
Tajikistan 8.4 72.7 3.37 50 9.027 60
Tunisia 3 60 1.669 66.6 0.805 61.5
Turkmenistan 5.5 0 3.401 33.3 5.64 66.7
United Arab Emirate 0 61.5 0 72.7 0 66.7
Uzbekistan 11.7 77.8 10.293 80 22.88 80
South Africa
Angola 44.8 66.7 55.076 58.3 35.146 50
Benin 20.5 60 15.144 66.6 17.774 61.5
Botswana 32.3 60 2.23 66.6 1.551 61.5
Burkina Faso 15.9 60 13.394 66.6 14.689 66.7
Burundi 5.1 61.5 2.569 63.6 1.5 54.5
Cameroon 4.3 60 3.621 72.7 3.185 69.2
Cape Verde 8.4 66.7 7.28 72.7 3.649 58.3
Chad 5.3 57.1 5.896 70 1.009 60
Congo 5.4 70 1.061 70 1.278 62.5
Cote d’Ivoire 1.9 60 1.636 72.7 1.853 69.2
Djibouti 2 50 0.15 66.7 0.1 44.4
Equatorial Guinea 0.3 87.5 0 55.5 0 63.6
Eritrea 10.6 70 13.124 70 26.529 66.7
Ethiopia 119.8 57.1 105373 72.7 73.874 69.2
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Gabon 2.7 64.3 2.493 70 2.614 62.5
Ghana 39.4 46.7 48.276 50 50.836 58.3
Guinea-Bissau 6.7 66.7 7.323 66.6 5.304 70
Guinea 19.9 64.3 15.601 66.6 15.141 61.5
Kenya 26.7 60 15.718 66.6 22.919 69.2
Lesotho 10 53.3 2.077 42.9 2.744 54.5
Madagascar 30 57.1 20.589 50 20.851 57.1
Malawi 68 53.8 31.297 72.7 35.628 54.5
Mali 34.9 60 31.297 60 33.375 66.7
Mauritania 2.7 57.1 2.194 70 3.039 61.5
Mauritius 0.2 60 0 66.6 0.025 69.2
Mozambique 66.9 66.7 45.428 63.6 53.158 61.5
Namibia 17 57.1 6.881 58.3 9.906 53.8
Niger 19.1 53.3 6.315 50 5.776 46.2
Nigeria 2.9 23.1 1.67 41.6 7 30.8
Rwanda 166.1 80 118.362 50 71.521 60
Senegal 25 54.5 22.15 80 24.988 61.5
Sierra Leone 10.1 66.7 26.748 58.3 6.289 58.3
Sudan 30.1 26.7 23.521 33.3 9.689 30.8
Swaziland 13.5 60 0.832 63.6 0.252 69.2
Tanzania 31.5 53.8 9.239 58.3 20.644 61.5
Togo 4.2 53.3 1.861 66.6 1.892 69.2
Uganda 58 53.3 39.749 58.3 54.615 54.5
Zambia 29.7 50 13.157 54.5 18.474 60
Zimbabwe 21.8 57.1 16.092 58.3 18.543 41.7
Indian Subcontinent
Bangladesh 146.9 53.3 76.121 60 68.322 53.8
India 164.6 40 161.512 33.3 139.618 38.5
Pakistan 17.1 46.7 6.493 50 2.5 38.5
Sri Lanka 13.3 53.3 12.479 58.3 3.62 53.8
Asia-Pacific
Bhutan 0 64.3 0 58.3 0 66.7
Brunei 0 53.3 0 58.3 0 53.8
China, PRC 0.6 33.3 0.696 41.6 0.891 46.2
Fiji 0 66.7 1.457 66.6 0 72.7
Indonesia 61.6 40 37.467 41.6 42.1 38.5
J^ a n 0 66.7 0 66.6 0 76.9
Korea 0 60 0.009 66.6 0 69.2
Laos 2.2 45.5 4 50 2.5 50
Malaysia 0.5 53.3 0.613 58.3 0.6 53.8
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Maldives 0.1 50 0.08 63.6 0.1 53.8
Mongolia 12.3 60 5-063 66.6 11.381 66.7
Myanmar 0.1 33.3 0 41.6 0 62.5
N. Korea DPRK 0 30.8 0 25 0 27.3
Nepal 17.1 64.3 18.802 66.6 22.168 75
Papua New Guinea 1.6 60 1.653 66.6 2.137 53.8
Philippines 52.8 60 45.993 72.7 51.884 53.8
Singapore 0 60 0.02 66.6 0 61.5
Solomon Islands 0 60 1.395 66.6 1.395 69.2
Thailand 6.1 60 4.864 66.6 5.943 61.5
Vanuatu 0 77.8 0 72.7 0.912 69.2
Vietnam 0 30.8 0 30 0 27.3
Western Samoa 0 60 1.144 66.6 1.136 69.2
* Total aid in millions of dollars (U.S.).
** Important votes adjusted for abstentions.
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